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The Status of Detainees from the

Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts
Srividhya Ragavan*
Michael S. Mireles, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION

On April 29, 2004, CBS 60 Minutes II horrified its viewers by showing
photographs of prisoners in humiliating poses taken at the United States' Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq.1 CBS relayed that the United States Army discharged
from duty seventeen American soldiers, on charges of mistreating prisoners
held at Abu Ghraib.2 The world watched one more postwar American action in
Iraq, disastrous by even the most optimistic accounts. High-ranking United
States government officials expressed concern, disgust, and disappointment
over the behavior of "a few bad apples" amidst the American soldiers.3
The exact reason for the prison abuse was unknown. The chain of
causation leading to the abuse was unclear.4 Defense Secretary Donald

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Norman,
Oklahoma.
**Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law, Sacramento, California.
'CBS News, Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, at http://www.cbsnews.com/ (Apr. 28,
2004).
2
1d.
3
1d. (quoting Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt as stating "[F]rankly, I think all of us are
disappointed by the actions of the few .... Every day, we love our soldiers, but frankly, some
days we're
not always proud of our soldiers.").
4
There have been several investigations of the Abu Ghraib scandal. The chain of causation
has been identified differently in each of the reports. See Bradley Graham & Josh White, Top
Pentagon Leaders Faulted in Prison Abuse, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28862-2004Aug24.html; see also ARTICLE
15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 22-24 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA
REPORT] (identifying as causative factor lack of standardization and accountability in specific
units), http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-abuse-report.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005);
INDEPENDENT

PANEL TO REVIEW

DOD DETENTION

OPERATIONS,

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEw DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 17 (2004) (suggesting serious

leadership
problem
as
cause
for
the
prison
abuse),
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005). See generally
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AT ABU GHRAIB (2004) ("The

abuses at Abu Ghraib primarily fall into two categories: a) intentional violent or sexual abuse
and, b) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretations or confusion regarding law or policy.
LTG Jones found that while senior level officers did not commit the abuse at Abu Ghraib they
did bear responsibility for lack of oversight of the facility, failing to respond in a timely manner
to the reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross and for issuing policy memos
that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level."),
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Rumsfeld insisted that the pictures portrayed abuse, not torture5 -an argument
designed to remove the issue from the purview of the Geneva Conventions,
which prohibit torture of prisoners of war.6 The Bush Administration asserted
that it was unconnected with the abuse.7 Officials merely acknowledged that
the failure of internal management led to the misbehavior of a rogue few.8 The
media, however, released photographs of abuse by members of different
battalions of soldiers, thereby implying that the abuse was not limited to a
few. 9 Moreover, critics pointed out that the photographs showed that soldiers
had adopted detention techniques previously used during the World Wars.' 0
Lawyers representing military personnel accused of the abuse argued that the
poses depicted in the photographs were stage managed, or alternatively, that
the soldiers were following orders, thus suggesting that the abuse was known
to, or authorized by, higher-ranking United States officers or intelligence
operatives. 1 Other allegations include an argument that the allegedly abusive
methods were already used in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and that the success of
those methods at extracting intelligence prompted its use in Abu Ghraib. 1
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay-report_8-25-04.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2005).
5See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Department Operational Update Briefing (May 4,
2004), at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040504-secdefl423.html (last visited
May 8, 2005).
6
There are four Geneva Conventions relating either to the conduct of war or to standards of
human rights. The Geneva Conventions were signed on August 12, 1949, and the two additional
Protocols were signed on June 8, 1977. This paper concentrates particularly on the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316
[hereinafter Convention III]; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Convention IV]; and the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter FAP].
7First Court-Martialin Iraqi PrisonerAbuse Scandal Draws Maximum Penaltyfor Sivits,
(CNN
television
broadcast,
May
19,
2004)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.cnn.comiTRANSCRIPTS/0405/19/lt.03.html). The Administration wanted the
world-especially a numbed Arab world-to watch its justice and democracy in action.
8
Bradley Graham, Army Investigates Wider Iraq Offenses: Cases Include Deaths, Assaults
Outside Prisons, WASH.
POST,
June
1, 2004,
at
AO1,
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4807-2004May3 1.html.
9
John Barry et al., Abu Ghraib and Beyond, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, at 30, available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4934436/site/newsweek.
'0See Julie Scelfo & Rod Nordland, Beneath the Hoods, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 2004, at 41,
available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5412316/site/newsweek. This Newsweek article shows a
picture that is widely known as the "Statue of Liberty" in Iraq. Id.
I"BBC News, Iraq Abuse 'Ordered From the Top,'
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/3806713.stm (last updated June 15, 2004).
12See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004 ("Ultimately,
what was developed at Gitmo was a '72-point matrix for stress and duress,' which laid out types
of coercion and the escalating levels at which they could be applied. These included the use of
harsh heat or cold; withholding food; hooding for days at a time; naked isolation in cold, dark
cells for more than 30 days, and threatening (but not biting) by dogs. It also permitted limited
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Thus, the 3 U.S. Army commenced an investigation of the treatment of
prisoners.'
The questionable treatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib served as the
impetus for renewed analysis of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to
determine the status of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq.14 The
Geneva Conventions consist of international treaties and protocols outlining
the rules governing the status and treatment of prisoners in a conflict. 5 The
Geneva Conventions, being codifications of principles of customary
international law, enjoy near-universal adoption by nations. The United States
military, which has followed customary international law for over one hundred
years, has a tradition of adherence to the Geneva Conventions. 16 The Bush
Administration, however, expressed concern as to whether "prisoners of the
war on terror" from both the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts were eligible for
protections under the Geneva Conventions.17 The Administration argued that
use of 'stress positions' designed to subject detainees to rising levels of pain.")
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989438/site/newsweek; Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
GTMO InterrogationTechniques, Dec. 2003, reprinted in WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at A14;
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Commander, USSOUTHCOM
(Jan. 15, 2003) (rescinding previous approval of one Category III technique for interrogating
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), available at http://news.findlaw.con/hdocs
/docs/dod/rums
11503mem.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005).
13
John Diamond & Tom Squitieri, Furorover Abuse Expands at Home and Abroad, USA
TODAY,
May
3,
2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-03-usprisonersx.htm (last updated May 6, 2004).
lnMilitary Officials Scrutinize Guantanamo Bay for Abuse, COLUM. DAILY TRIB., May 24,
2004, http://www.showmenews.com/2004/May/20040524News021.asp; see also Graham &
White, supra note 4 (citing some investigations).
15
See Frangois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the
Development of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 191, 192-94 (2004). The
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") has been the main driving force behind the
development of international humanitarian law for 140 years. Id. The ICRC's initiatives led to
the adoption of the original "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field, 22 August 1864," "an instrument that is the starting point of
contemporary international humanitarian law and a landmark in the development of public
international law; it was the ICRC that laid the groundwork for the subsequent developments of
that law." Id. Further, the Diplomatic Conferences held in 1949 revised the 1864 Convention and
adopted the four Geneva Conventions. Id. The First Geneva Convention addresses the
"Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field"; the Second Geneva Convention extends
protection to the naval forces; the Third Geneva Convention details the rules relating to
"Treatment of Prisoners of War"; and the Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilian
population during war times. Id. In 1977, a diplomatic conference of adopted the Protocols
additional to the 1949 Conventions. Id.; see also Soc'y of Prof. Journalists, Reference Guide to
the Geneva Conventions, at http://www.genevaconventions.org (last visited May 8, 2005)
(containing text and historic discussion of Conventions).
16See, e.g., Bryan Whitman, Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPW's and War Crimes
(Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/t04072003_t407genv.html (implying that
United17States has traditionally adhered to international law).
For example, the United States categorized the captured al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners
as "unlawful combatants" falling outside the protections of the Third Geneva Convention, but
nevertheless vowed to treat them humanely. See Memorandum from the White House on the
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the nature of the enemy involved in the war justified categorizing al-Qaeda and
the Taliban prisoners as 'unlawful combatants not eligible for protection'
under the Geneva Conventions. 18 Such interpretation provided the
Administration with unrestricted means to obtain information from the
detainees.
As for prisoners captured in the war in Iraq, the Administration indicated
that they belonged to a class different from that of the al-Qaeda insurgents, but
left the categorization ambiguous. Thus, when the Red Cross presented the
U.S. military a detailed catalog of abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison, the military
allegedly asserted "that many Iraqi prisoners were not entitled to the full
protections of the Geneva Conventions."' 19 The United States based its invasion
of Iraq on, among other things, the presence of hidden weapons of mass
destruction ("WMDs") that posed a national security threat. 20 Hence,
information on the presence of hidden WMDs from the prisoners was widely
acknowledged as having a direct political relevance because it could justifyin an election year-President Bush's decision to invade Iraq.2 I
Humane Treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, to the Vice President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter Memorandum on Humane Treatment] ("I accept the legal conclusion of the
Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons,
al Qaeda is
not a High Contracting
Party .
....
"),
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf; see also Sean D.
Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw: Decision
Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as POWs, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 477 (2002)
(explaining position of Bush Administration).
SSee Barry et al., supra note 9; see also Memorandum from Secretary of Defense, to Joint
Chief of Staff, on Status of Taliban and al-Qaeda (Jan. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Taliban and alQaeda Memo], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/62204index.html (last
visited May 8, 2005). See generally Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, to the President,
on Decision on Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War from Taliban and alQaeda (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum] (outlining implications of enemy
combatant declaration), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id14999148/site/newsweek/.
19Douglas Jehl & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Disputed Protected Status of Iraq Inmates, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
23,
2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/intemational/
middleeast/23IRAQ.html.
20
See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. In his speech, President
Bush said:
Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a
war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of
mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement.
He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were
in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these
weapons-not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even
cruise missile strikes on his military facilities.
Id.
21Barry et al., supra note 12 ("[A]nd Rumsfeld was getting impatient about the poor
quality of the intelligence coming out of there. He wanted to know: Where was Saddam? Where
were the WMD? Most immediately: Why weren't U.S. troops catching or forestalling the gangs
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The advantage of easy access to information notwithstanding, this Article
is premised on the idea that the exceptions created by the United States to the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions may be detrimental to the interests of
United States military personnel in future conflicts. Moreover, if the United
States shirks from or misinterprets international legal principles, it leaves the
forum open for other nations-like Israel or India, for example-to avoid their
responsibilities under international law against Palestine or Pakistan
respectively.2 2 The future course of international law will be impacted by the
United States' ability to adhere to international treaties to which it is a
signatory. Hence, the current administration bears a responsibility to avoid
unwisely stretching, distorting, or avoiding the principles of international law
for short-term gain in a manner that jeopardizes long-term sustainable policy.
The United States should be wary of creating a dangerous precedent-not only
for the world, but for itself. With this background, this Article focuses on the
legal status of the detainees from Afghanistan and Iraq under the Geneva
Conventions. Secondarily, this Article reviews the applicability of the
Convention on Torture.
Part II of this Article examines the Geneva Conventions and their
applicability to the war on terror. Part III discusses the status, under the
Geneva Conventions, of the detainees of the war on terror. Part IV discusses
the restrictions against torture under the Geneva Convention and the
Convention on Torture. Part V analyzes whether the United States' alleged
treatment of detainees of the war on terror violates the Geneva Conventions,
the Convention on Torture, and customary international law. While hindsight
is 20/20, the Article concludes that the United States should have capitalized
on the tremendous worldwide goodwill established after 9/1123 to advocate
exceptions to the Geneva Conventions' proscriptions on torture of alleged
terrorists, such as those advocated by Professor Dershowitz. 24 Instead, the
United States threatens not only to jeopardize respect for the international rule
of law, but to reduce its standing in the international community and to
endanger its own military personnel captured by an enemy in future conflicts.
planting improvised explosive devices by the roads? Rumsfeld pointed out that Gitmo was
producing
good intel.").
22
See Joshua S. Clover, Comment, "Remember, We're The Good Guys ": The
Classificationand Trial of the GuantanamoBay Detainees, 45 S.TEX. L. REv. 351, 353 (2004);
see also Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 176 (2004)
(arguing that doctrine of preemptive self-defense may enable India to justify attack on Pakistan).
23,,9/1 1" refers to the events of September 11, 2001, when airplanes were hijacked and
used to destroy the World Trade Center in New York and to damage the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C. See Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade
Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead: Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest
Alert, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A14035-2001
Sep11 .html.
24
See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ,

WHY TERRORISM WORKS

131-63

(2002)

(discussing proposals for limited use of torture in "ticking bomb terrorist" scenarios). The
authors do not believe that torture should be justified or excused in any circumstance.
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II. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE WAR ON
TERROR

The laws of occupation are found principally in three sources. The Hague
Regulations of 1907,25 which have the status of international customary law;
the Geneva Conventions of 1949;26 and the Additional Protocols to the
Convention, 27 adopted in 1977, which codify the principles of customary
international law on the subject.28 The term "Geneva Convention" refers to a
set of four Conventions and two Protocols concerning various wartime
protections. 29 The most relevant Conventions for this study are the Third
Geneva Convention,30 which focuses on the treatment of prisoners of war; the
Fourth Geneva Convention,3 1 concerning protections for civilians during war;
and the First Additional Protocol, which covers the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts.32
All concerned countries are signatories of Conventions III and IV. In
1956, Iraq acceded and Afghanistan ratified both Conventions. 33 The United
Kingdom and the United States-the two occupying powers of Iraq, as defined
in the Geneva Conventions34-ratified the Conventions in the years 1957 and
1955, respectively. 35 Thus, Conventions III and IV apply to the issues arising
from the American war on terror, which is primarily fought in Afghanistan and
Iraq.36 The United Kingdom is the only principal occupying country that has
25Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva
26 Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371.
Convention IV, supra note 6.
27

FAP, supra note 6.
Robbie Sabel, The ProblematicFourth Geneva Convention: Rethinking the International

28

Law of
29Occupation, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnewl20.php (July 16, 2003).

The idea of an international treaty to protect medical personnel is attributed to Henry
Dunant, a Swiss businessman who traveled to Lombardy to meet with Napoleon III to obtain an
agricultural estate in Algeria. Upon arrival, Dunant encountered soldiers of different nationalities
wounded in the battle of Solferino. Dunant, in a book called A Memory of Solferino, proposed
that states establish relief societies to assist their armed forces' medical services and that states
fashion an international agreement recognizing a legal basis for the protection of medical
personnel. Inspired by Dunant's writing on the mitigation of suffering during war, the Swiss
government formed a committee that later became known as the International Committee of the
Red Cross ("ICRC"). See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or
"Prisonersof War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 66 (2003)
(detailing
30 history of Geneva Convention and birth of law of war in United States).
Convention III, supra note 6.
3
'Convention IV, supra note 6.
32
FAP, supra note 6.
33
See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and Their
Protocols,
at
2,
4
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/
Additional
(Apr. 12, 2005).
iwpList103/77EA1BDEE2OB4CCDC1256B6600595596
34

1d. at 7.

35

Id.
/d.

36
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ratified the first Additional Protocol.37 Considering, however, that the Geneva
Conventions and its protocols are mere extractions of the customary rules of
the international law of war, the
provisions of the Protocols are applicable to
38
all parties in a general manner.
A. Whether the Geneva Convention Applies to the War on Terror
The application of the Geneva Conventions determines the status and
treatment meted out to detainees of war. The Geneva Convention:
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The
Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting 39Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Thus, the Conventions become applicable if: (a) there is a declared war
(irrespective of High Contracting Parties); (b) armed conflicts arise between
two or more High Contracting Parties; or (c) there is a partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party.
On a general note, the United States clearly and specifically declared
"war" on both Afghanistan and Iraq. 40 There have been few, if any, instances
of the Administration referring to the conflict in both nations as anything other
than "war." Standing alone, the declaration of war per se justifies the
application of the Geneva Convention to both conflicts.
1. Iraq
The Geneva Conventions should apply to the situation in Iraq because the
United States is an "occupying power" in Iraq, and Iraq is another High
37

See id. Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States have not endorsed this protocol.
Robert Kogod Goldman, The Legal Status of Iraqi and Foreign Combatants Capturedby
Coalition Armed Forces, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq4.html (Apr. 7,
2003); 39see also Sabel, supra note 28.
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 2, at 3318.
40
See Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 29, at 84 (arguing that President Bush adopted
Restatement position that is based on "the Estrada doctrine, which obviates recognition of new
governments, even those that come to power through extra-constitutional means as the Taliban
did");
CNN,
Afghanistan
Wakes
After
Night
of Intense Bombing,
at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/gen.america.under.attack/ (Oct. 7, 2001); CNN, Bush
Declares War, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/19/sprj.irq.int.bush.transcript/index.html
(Mar. 19, 2003). But see Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/1l Overreaction and FallaciesRegarding War
and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, JudicialReview of Detention, and
Due Processin Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335, 1340 n.20 (2004) (arguing
that conflict with Afghanistan is not war despite Bush Administration's categorization).
38
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Contracting Party. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, issued in
May of 2003, noted that the United States and the United Kingdom shared
"responsibilities[] and obligations .. .as occupying powers" in Iraq.4 ' The
Security Council specifically called upon all concerned states "to comply fully
with their obligations under international law including in particular the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. "42 Neither
the United States nor the United Kingdom objected to such compliance, thus
lending credence to arguments that the Geneva Convention applies to the
conflict and subsequent occupation of Iraq.
The United States, however, must clarify its position concerning the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict and subsequent
occupation of Iraq.43 For example, the occupation of Iraq began without a clear
mandate from the U.N. Security Council, 44 and the United States did not
establish clearly the reasons for its actions in Iraq. The Bush Administration
invaded Iraq based on the "doctrine of preemptive force," which can be
interpreted as a clear rejection of customary international laws, including the
Geneva Conventions.45 Accordingly, the international community may
question the legitimacy of the United States' actions in Iraq.46 The international
community may view the United States' invasion and occupation of Iraq as
being prompted by a desire for oil, aggression against Muslims, or even as
President Bush's personal vendetta against Saddam Hussein.4 7 Arguments by
the United States that the Geneva Convention does not apply to suspected
insurgents may lend more credence to some or more of these arguments.
Nonetheless, the progress of the war in Iraq has established the benefits of
broad international support,48 and as time goes on, the United States will find it
harder to dismiss the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the war in Iraq.
41

S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. SiRes/1483 (2003), available
at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscresolutions03.html (last visited May 8, 2005); see also
Convention III, supra note 6, art 3, at 3318-19 (discussing application of Geneva Convention in
cases of
42 occupation of territory of contracting party).
S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 41, at 2.
43
But see Sabel, supra note 28 (discussing application of Convention IV to conflict in
Iraq).
44See
Murphy, supra note 22, at 175-76.
45
See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Occupation of Iraq: What InternationalLaw Requires
Now, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forunnew107.php (Apr. 17, 2003).
46See The Weapons that Weren 't: How the Americans and British Got It So Wrong,
ECONOMIST,
July 15, 2004, at 23; see also The More Deceived?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 24.
47
See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, OCCUPATION FAILURES AND LEGALITY OF ARMED
CONFLICT: THE CASE OF IRAQI CULTURAL PROPERTY (Ohio State Univ. Moritz College of Law,
Working Paper No. 6, 2004) (analyzing whether means other than force could have been used to
achieve American agenda in Iraq), available at http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/moritzlaw/art6/
(Dec. 27, 2004).
48See, e.g., Associated Press, Bush Calls for International Support for Iraq, BOSTON
HERALD, June 26, 2004 (explaining that President Bush asked international community to help
control Iraq) http://news.bostonherald.com/national/view.bg?articleid=33433&format=-; see also
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2. Afghanistan
Both inside and outside the United States, people perceived the conflict
initiated by the United States in Afghanistan as a counterattack to the events of
9/11, but in the nature of war. The Bush Administration portrayed the conflict
as a single mission consisting of two objectives: to replace Afghanistan's
Taliban regime and to capture Osama Bin Laden, a militant harbored by the
Taliban. 49 The Administration questioned the applicability of the Geneva
Convention to the war in Afghanistan on the basis that the war was not waged
between two High Contracting Parties.5 ° A White House Memo signed by
Alberto Gonzales, reflecting the opinion of the Office of the Legal Counsel of
the Department of Justice, argues that the war in Afghanistan is not between
two High Contracting Parties because the Taliban (a) "did not exercise full
control over the territory and people" of Afghanistan; 5' (b) "was not
recognized by the international community"; 52 (c) was incapable "of fulfilling
its international obligations"; 53 and (d) was "not a government but a militant,
terrorist-like group." 54 Similarly, a memo written by former Secretary of State
Colin Powell refers to the "failed state" theory 55 to argue that the war in
Afghanistan does not fall within the Geneva Convention.56
Iraqi Government, at
Bush Asks EU Leaders to Support New
CNN,
(June 26, 2004).
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/O6/26/ireland.bush/
49
See Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 29, at 83 ("The Bush Administration has distinguished
between the Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners. The Bush Administration has justified this
distinction based on the Taliban's status as the de facto government of Afghanistan.").
5
°See Memorandum on Humane Treatment, supra note 17, at 1; see also Gonzales
Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1 (justifying previous decisions regarding prisoners of war). See
generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales
and William J. Haynes II, on Application of Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee January Memorandum] (discussing application of
treaties and laws to detainees), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp12202bybee.pdf.
srv/nation/documents/0
5
'See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1.
52
Id.
53
1d.
54
1d. The United States has also argued that since the Taliban and al-Qaeda are not High
Contracting Parties, they are not subject to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.
Hence, article 4 of Convention III, which defines prisoners of war, does not apply to those
captured in Afghanistan. See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney
General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, on the Status of Taliban Forces under Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949, at 2 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee February Memorandum]
(arguing that tribunal need be established only in event that status of combatants becomes
availableat http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/bybee20702mem.html.
"doubtful"),
55
See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to Counsel to the President,
on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Conflict in Afghanistan 1 (Jan. 25, 2002)
at
available
Memorandum],
Powell
[hereinafter
see also Bybee January
http://www.adamhodges.com/WORLD/docs/powell-memo.pdf;
Memorandum, supra note 50, at 11 (explaining reasons for categorizing Afghanistan as failed
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The Administration's arguments emphasize the Taliban's lack of
international recognition as a High Contracting Party even though close allies
of the United States, such as Pakistan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates, have accorded such recognition. 7 Further, the presence
of an alternate regime in Afghanistan, even if deposed, may have given more
credibility to the Administration's argument that the Taliban is a militant
organization and not a High Contracting Party. From 1996 to 2001,
Afghanistan was not ruled by any sovereign authority. 8 If the Taliban was
categorized as a militant regime and not a government, the United Nations and
the rest of the members of the Security Council would need to explain why
adequate action was not taken to establish a proper form of governance during
this period. It is, after all, the duty of the Security Council to "maint[ain]
international peace" under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter.5 9 The United
Nations recognized and acted upon its Article 24 duty when Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait. 60 Then, the United States, as a responsible member of the
Security Council, assisted the United Nations' efforts to restore Kuwait's
sovereignty. 6' Similarly, in 1992, the United Nations protected Afghanistan's
deposed ruler Najeebullaah when the Mujahideen took over Afghanistan.62
Logically, the United Nations should have taken similar steps when the
Taliban took over Afghanistan by replacing the then-elected government of
Burhannudin Rabbani.63 Instead, the Taliban came into power and remained in
power with huge support from Pakistan-a government recognized by the
United States as a close ally. 64 The minimal interference by the United Nations
when the Taliban took over from Rabbani leads to the conclusion that the
state). The memorandum examines the traditional indicia of statehood and argues, among other
things, that the Taliban lacked an organized form of government, did not control clearly defined
territory or population, never intended to carry out their international obligations, and merely
exhibited characteristics of a criminal gang. Id. The memorandum further argues that the
material breach of international treaties justifies the categorization of the Taliban as a "failed
state" 56
under international law. Id.
See Powell Memorandum, supra note 55, at 2.
57
Clover, supra note 22, at 359. But see Bybee January Memorandum, supra note 50, at
21. The memorandum advances the failed state theory on the basis that the government of the
Taliban lacked international recognition. Id. The memorandum emphasizes the withdrawal of
such recognition by Pakistan, just days before the launch of the counter attack, to substantiate
the lack
58 of recognition. Id.
Afghanistan Online, Chronological History of Afghanistan, at http://www.afghanweb.com/history/chron/index4.html
(last updated Apr. 10, 2005).
59
See U.N. CHARTER art. 24, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited
May 8,
602005).
See
CNN,
Strike
on
Iraq:
The
Persian
Gulf
War,
at
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/iraq/9802/gulf.war.recap/prelude/ (last visited May 8,
2005).6 1
id
62
See Afghanistan Online, supra note 58.
63
Lawrence Azubuike, Status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19
CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 133 (2003) (discussing history of Afghanistan).
64Id.
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international community may not have considered the Taliban as an ally, but
nevertheless treated it as a High Contracting party.
The invasion of Afghanistan was approved by the United Nations by
treating the Taliban as Afghanistan's ruling government. 65 That the United
Nations approved the use of force by treating the invasion as a conflict
between two nations suggests that the conflict is a "war" under the Geneva
Conventions.66 Moreover, despite discussing "international terrorism," the
relevant Security Council Resolution does not indicate that the Taliban regime
was, itself, considered to be an international terrorist organization.67 Also, the
Preamble of another Security Council Resolution, dated November 14, 2001,
states the following:
Condemning the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a
base for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaeda network and other
terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Usama Bin Laden,
al-Qaeda and others associated with them, and in this context
supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban
regime .... 6
The Preamble notes that the ruling Taliban allowed Afghanistan to be
used as a base for the al-Qaeda terrorist network; it identifies al-Qaeda alone as
the terrorist network. Elsewhere, the paragraph outlines the United Nations'
commitment to "the efforts of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime
,,69 Thus, the wording establishes the construct of war by treating the
....
Taliban as the ruling government.7 °
The United States, however, may prefer to construe its role as supporting
a national movement among Afghans to overthrow the Taliban. The
Administration may choose to interpret its role as "help[ing] the people of
Afghanistan" to replace the Taliban in order to establish democracy, "lasting
peace, stability, and respect for human rights., 71 Even this argument, however,
may be inadequate to argue that the conflict between the United States and
Afghanistan falls outside the purview of the Geneva Convention since conflicts
65

See S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 4415th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc S/RES/1378 (2001)
[hereinafter Resolution 13781, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (last
visited66May 8, 2005).
See Azubuike, supra note 63, at 134 (discussing relevant U.N. Resolutions).
67
See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (last visited May 8, 2005); see also
Resolution
1378, supra note 65, at 1-2.
68
See Resolution. 1378, supra note 65, at 1-2.
69
1d.
70

Clover, supra note 22, at 366 (stating that "while perhaps not formally recognized, the
Taliban governed Afghanistan at the time of the Guantanamo detainees' capture" as reason for
Taliban prisoners status of POWs).
granting
71
See S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 4434th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1383 (2001),
availableat http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (last visited May 8, 2005).
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"not of an international character" is governed by article 3 of Convention III.
72
Then, Article 3, not Article 2, of Convention III may become applicable.
Article 3 of Convention III includes conflicts "not of an international
character" within the Geneva Convention protections.7 3 The United States,
however, may seek to limit Article 3's application to internal conflicts that lack
international involvement, like civil wars. Thus, the United States may argue
that no provision of the Geneva Convention directly addresses the situation in
Afghanistan.74 Instead, the United States may want to characterize the situation
as a conflict as between itself and al-Qaeda. Such a characterization, however,
does not account for the United States' stated intention to take action against
then leader of the Taliban, Mulla Omar.7 5
When in response to the attacks on 9/11, President Bush decided to place
the United States in a state of armed conflict against Afghanistan, he decided
to wage "war., 76 The Administration's Deputy Assistant Attorney General has
defended the categorization of the conflict as war by arguing that as a matter of
domestic law, the President's finding settles the question whether the United
States is at war.77 In The Prize Cases,78 the Supreme Court explained that the
President had the authority to determine when a state of war existed.7 9 In the
case of Afghanistan, the Administration has repeatedly emphasized the nature
of the conflict as "war." Moreover, critics have argued that not conferring the
status of "war" to the Afghan conflict may be detrimental to the United States
because it would exempt terrorists from established international rules and
conventions. 80 Thus, in the context of international practices and the
72

See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3, at 3318-20.
1d. at 3318; see also John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L.
207, 214 (2003) (explaining when Geneva Conventions do not apply to conflicts).
74
Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 4 (arguing that war in Afghanistan does
not fit 75within any categories described in Common Article 3).
See Marines Comb the Taliban Complex: Mullah Omar Is Believed to Be HidingNearby,
S.F.
CHRON.,
Jan.
2,
2002,
at
A6,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2002/01/02/MN71595.DTL. But see Bybee February Memorandum, supra
note 54, at 4 (arguing that Taliban lacks proper command and that members functioned more as
militia). Although militia members fall within the ambit of the Geneva Convention, the Bybee
memo argues that the lack of a proper commander results in the Taliban falling outside the
definition
of "prisoner of war." Id.
76
See Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 29, at 73-74 (highlighting that President Bush
categorized
conflict in Afghanistan as war).
77
See Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo Letter], available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102ltr.html
(last visited May 8, 2005).
78
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 665-66 (1862). But see Nickolas A. Kacprowski, Stacking
the Deck Against Suspected Terrorists: The Dwindling ProceduralLimits on the Government's
Power to Indefinitely Detain United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants, 26 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 651, 658-59 (2003) (arguing that The Prize Cases do not apply).
79The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670; see also Yoo & Ho, supra note 73, at 211. Although
Yoo and Ho's article states that it is their personal opinion, the government finally adopted the
opinion. Id.
80Yoo & Ho, supra note 73, at 215.
73
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declaration of war by the United States against Afghanistan, arguments that the
conflict in Afghanistan falls outside the purview of the Geneva Convention
remain unpersuasive. Even within the Bush Administration, different entities
have offered conflicting views. The Secretary of State in a memorandum offers
an alternate argument that the Convention applies to the Taliban and the war in
Afghanistan. 8 1 A Working Group Report classified by the Pentagon, however,
argues that the Convention may be inapplicable to the Taliban.8 2
Notwithstanding the applicability of Convention III, the war in
Afghanistan may still fall within the Geneva Conventions under the First
Additional Protocol ("FAP"). Under the FAP, the Conventions apply in
situations of "armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against . . . alien
occupation., 83 The FAP is a codified version of the customary rules of
international law and cannot be dismissed from the conflict in Afghanistan.
B. Who Are "Prisonersof War"
Participants of war fall into several categories. Both participants of war
and nonparticipating civilians may become prisoners of the other warring
faction. "Prisoners of war"-a status conferred by Article 4A of Convention III
on some of these detainees-are eligible for the minimum standards of
treatment detailed in the Convention.84 Convention IV further protects civilian
detainees captured by the "occupying power., 85 The Conventions' protection
begins at capture and extends until either the prisoner is released or trial ends.86
All combatants captured in an international armed conflict are deemed
"prisoners of war" until their status is appropriately determined. 87 Detainees
ineligible for "prisoner of war" status do not benefit from the protections of the
Convention. For instance, such detainees may be tried for taking part in
hostilities, although they may be eligible for humane treatment by virtue of
8

1Powell Memorandum, supra note 55, at 1-4.
See WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE

82

INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 4

(2003)

[hereinafter

WORKING

GROUP

REPORT],

available

at

http://www.npr.org/documents/2004/dodmemo03O3O6.pdf.
83
FAP, supra note 6, at 7.
84
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4, at 3320.
85
See Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 4, at 3518.
86
See Goldman, supra note 38. Notably, the protections afforded prisoners of wardetailed below---do not preclude fair trial for war crimes (and, in some cases, other punishable
crimes).
87 Id. The combatants will be tried and punished, if proven guilty. Id.
See Human Rights Watch, BackgroundPaperon Geneva Conventions and Persons Held
by U.S. Forces [hereinafter Background Paper], at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/powbck.htm (Jan. 29, 2002); see also Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4, at 3324 ("Should any
doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories... [for POWs],. . . such persons shall enjoy
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.").
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international humanitarian and human rights law. 8 8 The burden on the Bush
Administration to refuse the prisoner of war status to detainees is higher
because, traditionally, the United States has applied
the standards of treatment
89
in the Geneva Convention to detainees of war.
Convention III places participants of war into two distinct categories:
members entitled to bear arms and members without such entitlement. Under
customary international law, members entitled to bear arms are privileged
combatants, privileged "by a party to such an armed conflict to engage in
hostilities." 90 Privileged combatants include "[m]embers of the armed forces
of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces," and "[m]embers of regular armed forces
who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power." 91 The privilege to participate in hostilities also guarantees
"prisoner of war" status upon capture, as well as immunity from prosecution
for lawful acts of war. 92 Convention III also extends "prisoner of war" status to
persons who would otherwise remain unprotected if captured, like those who
accompany the armed forces, such as civilian members of military aircrafts,
pilots, or war correspondents.9 3 Any captured member of the armed forces, if
wounded or sick in captivity, is also entitled
to protections equivalent to that of
94
III.
Convention
under
war"
of
"prisoner
a
Article 4A(2) of the Convention deems two classes of combatants as
privileged subject to certain conditions. The first class of combatants deemed
privileged include "[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory" who
spontaneously become combatants to resist an invading enemy. 95 "Spontaneity
means that there is no time to organize into regular forces, ' 96 although they
must openly carry arms and follow the rules of war. The second class of
combatants deemed privileged include members of a party to the conflict, but
belonging to militias, volunteer corps, or resistance movements, and not
forming a part of the regular army under article 4A(2). In order to benefit from
the Convention's protections, "such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements," including insurgents, members of militia not

88Human Rights Watch, Legal Issues Arising from the War in Afghanistan and Related

Anti-Terrorism
Efforts
[hereinafter
Legal
Issues
from
Afghanistan],
at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/septemberl
1/ihlqna.htm (last visited May 8, 2005).
89
See Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to the President (Feb. 1, 2002), at 1-2,
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/jash20102ltr.html (last visited May 8,
2005); see also Bybee January Memorandum, supra note 50, at 25-27 (discussing in detail
intervention by United States in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Bosnia, and other regions).
90
Goldman, supra note 38.
91
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4A(l), (3), at 3320.
92Id.
93

1d. art. 4A(5), at 3320.
See FAP, supra note 6, arts. 43, 44, at 23-24.
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4A(2), at 3320.
96
See Goldman, supra note 38.
94
95
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recognized by occupying power, and guerilla fighters, are subject to certain
conditions. They should:
97

war.

(a) "belong to a party to the conflict";
98
(b) be "commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates";
(c) "hav[e] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance"; 99
(d) "carry their arms openly;"' 00 and
(e)
"conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
01

,1

Members of resistance movements fulfilling the above conditions are to
be treated as prisoners of war on capture. The Convention implies that the
entire organization-militias or volunteer corps as a group-is entitled to
protection, assuming the stated conditions are fulfilled. The Convention does
not clarify the extent of protection in circumstances where the organization as
a whole qualifies for the protections of prisoners of war, but individual
members violate the Convention conditions. That is, it is unclear whether
abrogation of the stated conditions by individual members, or even a group,
results in exemption of the entire organization from protected status. For
example, if one or a few members of an organization decide not to carry arms
openly, it is an open question as to whether all members of the organization
lose prisoners of war status if they are captured.
Some suggest that only the first three criteria-belonging to a party to the
conflict, as organized groups, under responsible command-are meant for only
the organization as a whole.10 2 The other conditions-having a distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly, and conducting their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war-apply to both the
organization as well as the individual members.10 3 Such a thesis, however,
means that if one or a few members of the organization do not follow the
conditions, all members of the organization would be disqualified from the
Convention's protections.10 4 However, excluding an entire organization,
irrespective of its size, because one or a few members did not follow the
specified conditions, is inconsistent with the stated purpose of Convention III,
which is to reduce abuse of prisoners. Moreover, the practical difficulties of
impartially determining whether a particular combatant adhered to the
97

1d.
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4(A)(2), at 3320.
99
i.
100 d.
1012 d.
98

11See id.
0
1 3 1d.

°41d. ("[I]f a majority of the members of the group fail to meet, for whatever reason, all or
any of the last three conditions at any time, then all members of the group will not qualify for
privileged combatant and POW status upon capture.").
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conditions could lead to misuse and ultimately, the abuse of detainees by
occupying powers.
The interpretation favoring protection for the organization as a whole,
even when individual members violate the conditions, is indirectly supported
by article 5, which states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong
to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.10 5
The use of the term "such persons" implies that the question of whether a
detainee will be disqualified from the Convention's protections will be handled
on an individual, rather than on an organizational, basis. In other words, loss of
Convention's protection will be confined to individual detainees rather than the
entire organization.
Persons not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war under Convention III
may nonetheless qualify for similar protections under the FAP or under article
4, Convention IV. 10 6 The FAP specifies that "[i]n cases not covered by this
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of
public conscience. '' 1' With the objective of supplementing the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions, article 3 of the FAP helps clarify the language in
Convention III that states, "[a]lthough one of the Powers in conflict may not be
a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations."' 1 8 For example, even though the
United States is not a signatory to the FAP, it cannot refuse to treat humanely
detainees who fall outside the ambit of Article 4A(2) of Convention 111.109 The
FAP prevents the endangerment, either by willful commission or negligent
omissions, of qualifying persons.1 0 Similarly, any militia member or insurgent
ineligible for protection under Convention III for not following one or more of
the conditions may fall within the definition of a "protected person" under
Convention IV, provided the individual is not from a neutral country."' A
protected person is a detainee captured by armed forces of a party to the
conflict to which he is not a national.
05

106Convention

III, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3324 (emphasis added).
See Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 4(2), at 3320.

107
FAP,
08

supra note 6, art. 1, at 7.

Convention III, supra note 6, art. 2, at 3318.
09
1 See Legal Issues from Afghanistan, supra note 88.
1
See FAP, supra note 6, art. 11, at 8.
.

11llId.
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Article 5 of Convention IV, however, creates a major exception to
prisoner of war protection for those who fall within two risk categories.
Individuals in the first risk category ("Risk I members") are those suspected of
12
engaging in or engaged in actions hostile to the security of the state.'
Presumably, the reference is to the security of the occupied territory. Risk 13I
members are denied the specific rights and privileges under Convention IV.
Individuals in the second risk category ("Risk II members") are those
suspected of posing a definite threat to the security of the occupying powers.
Such individuals can be denied the right to communication, but are entitled to
every other privilege under Convention IV. Importantly, both Risk I and I
individuals are entitled to fair trial, since denial of their rights and privileges is
based solely on "definite suspicion." Since the terms "definite suspicion" and
"suspicion" are not defined, as a matter of caution, such individuals are entitled
to fair and quick trials at the earliest possible time after their capture.
Moreover, the denial of rights and privileges under Article 5 of the Convention
is not a denial of the general right to humane treatment during captivity under

international law and the FAP.
C. Determination of Prisonerof War Status
Article 5 of Convention III provides that detainees whose status is unclear
"shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal."'1 4 The treatment meted
out to these individuals during detention and until determination of status
should be equivalent to that which is provided to "prisoners of war." The status
of a detainee should be determined by a competent Tribunal established
pursuant to the Geneva Conventions. President George Washington authorized
the earliest of such military tribunals in 1780, to try a British detainee allegedly
captured with the defense plans of West Point." 5
With respect to the war on terror, President Bush issued an Executive
Order" l6 authorizing the Secretary of Defense to set up a military
1"2See Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3520-22.
113
Id.
14

1 See Convention 1II, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3320.
115
See ABA TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW,
ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS 3 (2004)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[hereinafter ABA RECOMMENDATIONS], available at

http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf, see also Jonathan Mahler, Commander Swift
Objects, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 13, 2004, at 42 (discussing Guantanamo Bay detainees).
Military commissions derive their authority from Articles I and II of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-14 (granting Congress power to provide for
common defense including offenses against Law of Nations, to support Armies and to provide
for Navy, and to make regulations thereof); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (conferring on
President executive Power and making him Commander in Chief of Army and Navy); see also
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (providing for military commissions).
116
See President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, at § 1(a) (Nov. 13,
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commission" 17 to provide for detention, treatment, and trial by tribunal of
noncitizens captured in the war on terror. 1 8 Some critics have argued that the
lack of prior congressional approval makes the tribunal unconstitutional.' 19 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of similar tribunals
in Ex parte Quirin120 and Application of Yamashita.121 Quirin, however, left
open the issue of whether prior congressional approval was necessary to
supplement the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief to establish a
military commission. 122 Thus, the constitutionality of military tribunals set up
by a Presidential Order without congressional approval remains unclear. 23
2001)
[hereinafter
President's
Military
Order],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/1 1/20011113-27.html. By a Joint Resolution,
President Bush was authorized to use military force and to do all that is necessary for the
operation. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter Military Force Joint Resolution].
11'president's Military Order, supra note 116, at § 1(a).
I18 1d.
"19Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 21 (2001); see also Bryan Robinson, Due Process or Star Chamber?, at
http://www.michaelkeller.com/news/news3 60.htm (Nov. 15, 2001).
12'317 U.S. 1, 33, 35 (1942). The Supreme Court authorized the jurisdiction of the military
tribunals to try U.S. citizens as well as foreign belligerents. After the surrender and occupation
of Germany and Japan in 1945, military tribunals tried U.S. citizens for ordinary criminal
activity in the occupied territories. See Amanda Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Terrorists:An In-Depth Analysis of the Government's Right to Classify United States
Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try Those Enemy Combatants by
Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1465, 1466-70 (2003).
121327 U.S 1, 25 (1946); see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952)
(upholding jurisdiction of military commission to try U.S. citizen for murdering her U.S.
serviceman husband); ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 115, at 3; Background Paper,supra
note 87 ("Under the 1997 U.S. military regulations, persons whose status is to be determined
shall: be advised of their rights at the beginning of their hearings; be allowed to attend all open
sessions and will be provided with an interpreter if necessary; be allowed to call witnesses if
reasonably available, and to question those witnesses called by the tribunal; have a right to
testify or otherwise address the Tribunal; and not be compelled to testify before the Tribunal.").
22
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what
extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized
trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions."); ABA RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 115, at 4; see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1281 (2002) (questioning applicability
of Quirin as precedent for military tribunal established by President George Bush). But see
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 at 11 ("The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have
committed violations of the law of war is thus not only a part of the conduct of war operating as
a preventive measure against such violations, but is an exercise of the authority sanctioned by
Congress to administer the system of military justice recognized by the law of war."); John M.
Bickers, Military Commissions Are Constitutionally Sound: A Response to Professors Katyal
and Tribe,
34 TEX. TECH L. REv. 899, 900 (2003) (criticizing Katyal and Tribe).
123The ABA in its Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions argues that a
"Joint Resolution authorizing the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against any
entity to prevent international terrorism, provides the necessary authority to set up a military
Tribunal." ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 115, at 6 (internal quotation marks and citation
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Notwithstanding the constitutionality of setting up the tribunal, the terms of
establishment have been a subject of severe criticism. For example, the
President's Order authorizes detention of individuals invoking the "reason to
believe" standard. 124 That is, individuals can be detained because there is a
reason to believe that they committed the prohibited activities.' 25 By definition,
"individuals" excludes citizens, but includes legal residents of the United
States; thus, every noncitizen, including legal residents (Green Card Holders)
for several years, would fall within the Order's purview. 126 The Order provides
a scope for indefinite detention by providing that detainees, "when tried," will
be "tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals;"'' 27 and individuals, "when tried" will be tried for offenses allegedly
committed. 128 The Order denies the detainees "the privilege[] to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such
remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the
United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii)
any international tribunal.", 2 9 The evidentiary standard for the Tribunal is mere
satisfaction, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military commission,
of "probative value to a reasonable person.' 30 Thus, the trial contemplated by
the tribunal denies established standards and procedures to the detainees and
lacks adequate procedural safeguards. 13 1 Thus, the Order violates article 14 of

omitted). Others, like Professor Bickers, have criticized those who question the constitutionality
of the tribunals
as being ideologically driven. Bickers, supra note 122, at 900.
24
1 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 122, at 1263 ("The Order is so written that virtually
any act
by an alien, anywhere, could, in theory, give the President 'reason to believe' the alien either has
or once had some form of tribunal-triggering involvement with some international terrorist
organization.").
125id.
126 President's Military Order, supra note 116, at § 2(a) ("The term 'individual subject to

this order' shall mean any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I
determine from time to time in writings."); see also ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 115,
at 15 ("The President's order applies to all non-citizens, including aliens lawfully present in the
United States. The breadth of the President's order raises serious constitutional questions under
existing precedent."). But see Oral Argument at 23-25 (Ted Olsen, Apr. 20, 2004), Rasul v.
Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) [hereinafter Oral Argument] ("Citizenship is a foundation for a
relationship between the nation and the individual .... [The] Court goes on to say that we have
pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens whether friendly or enemy,
that specifically addresses one of the points you mentioned, only because permitting their
presence
in the country implied protection.").
127 President's Military Order, supra note 116, at § 1(e).
12'See id. at § 4.
129
See id. at § 7(b)(2); see also ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 115, at 15 ("Military
commissions are subject to habeas corpus proceedings in federal court, at least as to persons
present in
the United States and to U.S. citizens.").
130ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 115, at 11.
13
'See Military Force Joint Resolution, supra note 116; ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 115, at 13.
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the International 32
Convention on Civil and Political Rights to which the United
party.
a
is
States
The tribunal itself has not been established. Instead, detainees have been
held indefinitely without proper charges or trial dates.1 33 In defense of the
inordinate delay in convening the tribunal, Professor Bickers argues that "the
fact that military commissions have not yet been convened to try anyone in the
current struggle does not mean that they have had no effect upon the nation.'1 3 4
Unfortunately, the "effect upon the nation" is not a measure of justice under
any sophisticated legal system-national or international. Instead, Professor
Bickers justifies his opinion on the basis that "[e]nemy belligerents who attack
135
the United States should not benefit from any of these rights.,
Unfortunately, the argument undermines the importance of a proper basis for
defiming "enemy belligerents" of the United States. Obviously neither a soldier
in the middle of a war nor a prison guard can become roaming tribunals who
1 36
determine whether an individual or a detainee is an enemy belligerent.
Moreover, during the interim period when the United States continues to detain
without trial, several Iraqi detainees merely suspected of knowing information
have been subject to treatment that qualifies to moderate and reasonable minds
as "torture" rather than mere "abuse." It is unclear how the objective of the
war-establishing democracy in the Middle East--can be achieved by
conceiving of a tribunal without provisions for basic principles of law, rules of
evidence, or minimal judicial mechanisms. The military tribunals could have
been an important means to display the benefits of American democracy to the
Middle East.' 37 Instead, the United States has yet to provide even a semblance
of justice. 138
D. Status of Prisonersfrom Afghanistan
Prisoners from the conflict between Afghanistan and the United States can
be categorized as the Taliban fighters, general Afghan fighters, al-Qaeda
fighters, or international fighters (who either supported al-Qaeda or opposed
the United States). The following section discusses the status of each category
132International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171

[hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last visited
May 8, 2005); see also ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 115, at 12 n.29 ("Since the United
States joined
the Covenant, it has not departed from its provisions.").
1331nsight: PrisonersStill Held at Guantanamo Bay (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 13,
2004) 1(transcript
available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0401/13/iins.00.html).
34
Bickers, supra note 122, at 900.
135
Id. at 925.
136But see Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 8 (arguing that tribunal has to
be established
only in event that status of combatants becomes "doubtful").
137Barry et al., supra note 12.
138Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 29, at 66 (discussing rationale of classification of detainees
under Bush administration and arguing that classification of detainees as group may be flawed).
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of detainee and whether the location of detention affects the status or the rights
of the detainee under the Geneva Convention.
The Bush Administration has not clarified the status of the prisoners from
the war in Afghanistan. On occasion, the Administration asserted that Taliban
and al-Qaeda detainees were not entitled to "prisoner of war" status under
Convention 111.139 A memorandum, authored by then-White House Counsel
Alberto R. Gonzales, suggested that the Geneva Convention does not apply to
Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees because the Taliban was not a High
Contracting Party, and because the Taliban and al-Qaeda were militant
organizations. 140 Not conferring "prisoner of war" status on the captured
individuals allows the United States to avoid its obligations to the prisoners
under the Geneva Conventions.
Alternately, a memorandum signed by then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell suggested that the Geneva Convention applies to all members of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda. 141 The Secretary, however, was not averse to refusing
"prisoner of war" status to the detainees, provided they were treated in a
manner consistent with the Geneva Convention.1 42 Subjecting the conflict to
the Geneva Convention obligates the terrorists to adhere to the laws of war
while denying "prisoner of war" status relieves the United States of its
obligations to the detainees. Thus, the Secretary's position retains the
substance of the Geneva Conventions while disengaging its spirit.
Interestingly, a Working Group Report classified by the Pentagon reflects
the Gonzales position that Convention III applies to neither al-Qaeda nor
Taliban members, since neither are High Contracting Parties. 143 But the
memorandum argues that the fact that the Taliban is not a High Contracting
Party does not affect the application of the Geneva Convention to the conflict
itself. 144 Under this view, Taliban and al-Qaeda militants are required to follow
the laws of war under principles of customary international law, but the United
States' treatment of the detainees need not be consistent with principles of
customary international law.
1. The Taliban Detainees
The Administration's case that the Taliban is not a High Contracting Party
139

0n February 7, 2002, President Bush announced that Convention III applied to
members of the Taliban, since there was an armed conflict between two parties to the
Convention-the United States and Afghanistan. Murphy, supra note 17, at 478. The president
also maintained, however, that the Taliban's actions in violating the laws of war and closely
associating itself with al-Qaeda effectively stripped Taliban members of their rights as prisoners
of war. Id.
140See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2.
14 1
Powell Memorandum, supra note 55, at 1-4.
142
1d. at 1.
14 3
See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 82, at 3.
144Id.
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is unconvincing. The several reasons outlined in Part Ill-including
recognition by allies of United States, governing status, and the position of the
United Nations-compels the conclusion that Taliban members should be
treated as the military of Afghanistan. If detained by the United States, they
should be granted prisoner of war status. 145 Because the Taliban governed
Afghanistan at the beginning of hostilities, the Afghanistan army, however
dismantled, fell under the command of the Taliban. Accordingly, Taliban
members fought either as the Afghan military or along with the military as
militia.
2. The Taliban as Afghan Military
In assuming that Taliban members fought as part of Afghanistan's regular
army, a memorandum from Gonzales to President Bush argues that the Taliban
detainees are ineligible for "prisoner of war" status because they violated
article 4A(2) conditions. 46 The memorandum argues that the article 4A(2)
147
conditions are part and parcel of the definition of "regular armed forces."'
Because militia members are expected to follow the article 4A(2) conditions,
the memorandum argues that armed forces representing a nation could not
have been excluded from that definition. Article 4A(2) conditions, however,
are specifically limited with respect to militia members. Hence, the
memorandum's construction may be inadequate to remove Taliban detainees
from protections meant for "prisoners of war."
3. The Taliban with Afghan Military
If the Taliban is considered to be a mere militia, the Taliban fighters-as
militia members forming a part of Afghanistan's armed forces--qualify for
"prisoners of war" status under article 4A(1) of the Convention. 14 1
Considering, however, that the Taliban governed Afghanistan at the beginning
of hostilities, the Afghanistan army fell within the command of the Taliban.
145See Background Paper,supra note 87.
46
1 Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 1; see also Gregory
M. Travalio,
Terrorism, InternationalLaw, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145, 184 n.140
(2000) (arguing that terrorists do not qualify as "prisoners of war"). But see Michael N. Schmitt,
Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its PossibleImplications
for the Law ofArmed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1077-78 (1998) (implying that Taliban
and al-Qaeda could probably fall within definition of prisoners of war by arguing that 1949
Geneva47Convention changed protections for combatants by including militia members).
1 Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 1.
148See Clover, supra note 22, at 354; see also George H. Aldrich, Comment, The Taliban,
al-Qaeda,and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891, 893-94 (2002)
(supporting argument that Taliban falls within ambit of article 4A(l) of Geneva Convention);
Bybee January Memorandum, supra note 50, at 9 (arguing that close nexus between Taliban and
al-Qaeda causes Taliban to fall within definition of militia and thus, disqualifies those captured
in war from prisoner of war status).
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Accordingly, Taliban fighters have to be construed to be a part of the
Afghanistan army. Alternatively, if the Taliban is viewed as militia not
forming a part of the Afghan forces, detainees will continue to qualify for
"prisoner of war" status under article 4A(2), but will be subject to the
restrictions detailed in the article. The Taliban fulfills the first requirement of
the article because it belongs to Afghanistan, a party to the dispute. The
Taliban also had a clear commander-Mulla Omar himself-who was
presumably responsible for subordinates. 149
Determining the second criterion-whether the Taliban conducted its
operations within the laws of war-is more difficult. Determination of this
condition may become dependant on the resolution of the nature of the 9/11
attacks. If the 9/11 attacks are construed as the beginning of hostilities, then the
Taliban likely violated the rules of war because of its presumed involvement
with al-Qaeda's actions on that day. The Bush Administration has argued that
the Taliban "knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist
objectives of the al-Qaeda."' 150 The Administration construes the role of the
Taliban in harboring al-Qaeda as a violation of the rules of war, which results
in the disqualification of detainees for "prisoners of war" status under the
Convention. 151
The 9/11 attacks, however, are also classified as an attack by al-Qaeda.' 5 2
However, al-Qaeda has attacked the United States prior to September 2001.
These attacks include the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000,153 the bombing
of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,154 and the bombing of
the World Trade Center in 1993.' Arguably, it may become difficult to
149 Clover, supra note 22, at 353 (reiterating same argument). But see Diana K. Hook,
Detainees or Prisoners of War?: The Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Law on
available
at
2002),
(Nov.-Dec.
BAR
6
J.
Mo.
Terror,
58
http://www.mobar.org/journal/2002/novdec/hook.htm(The "Taliban's military forces have been
run by an ever-changing cast of commanders whose authority is unclear, especially since the
Taliban regime has toppled."). However, the only requirement under the Convention is some
authority; there are no conditions on how often the authority is replaced, or whether there was
clarity of authority. As long as there was some recognition of authority, which there was, the
Taliban will fall within in this condition.
150
Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the
Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/05/; The White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, at http://
(Feb. 7, 2002).
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/
15
'See Bybee January Memorandum, supra note 50, at 31.
152
See, e.g., Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 29, at 59 n.5.
153See generally Raphael Perl & Ronald O'Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole:
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/crs/
Congress,
Issues
for
and
Background
coleterrattckl300l.pdf (Jan. 30, 2001).
154See
generally
CNN,
Four
Embassy
Bombers
Get
Life,
at
(Oct. 21, 2001).
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/LAW/1O/19/embassy.bombings/index.html
155
See generally BBC, 1993: World Trade Center Bombing Terrorizes New York, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/26/newsid_2516000/2516469.stm
(Feb. 26, 1993).
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construe the attacks of September 11, 2001, as the beginning of hostilities,
especially since the Taliban has given sanctuary to al-Qaeda since 1996.156
Alternatively, the 9/11 attacks may be construed as a crime, such mass
murder.157 If so construed, applying the laws of armed conflict against alQaeda and the Taliban militia may be questionable. 158 The rights of
government authorities may be limited to arresting members of terrorist
organizations when they have sufficient evidence
of probable cause to believe
59
those members have violated a criminal law. 1
If, on the other hand, hostilities are construed to have begun when the
United States invaded Afghanistan, then it can be argued that most members of
the Taliban observed the laws of war for the purposes of the second condition
outlined in article 4A(2). Many critiques, however, expressed doubts as to
whether the nature of the conflict initiated by the United States in Afghanistan
is a war. It has been argued that the "war on terror" is akin to the "war on
160
drugs," fought on many territories outside of the United States.
Others have argued that the Taliban does not follow the laws of war
because of "[v]iolations includ[ing] preventing Afghan women from being
employed or educated, forcing Afghan women to be covered completely by
burqas, prohibiting medical services for women, and allowing women to be
raped as spoils of war. Members of the Taliban have also massacred thousands
of innocent civilians ....
161 Interestingly, a memorandum addressed to the
President and signed by Gonzales, addressing the "Status of the Taliban Forces
under Article 4" of Convention III, points to the Taliban's alleged atrocities in
Afghanistan-including raping women and killing civilians-as violations of
the laws of war justifying denial of the prisoner of war status. 62 However,
under the Geneva Convention, neither the Taliban's support of al-Qaeda nor
violations against women and other civilians of Afghanistan can be
determinative of whether the Taliban detainees followed the rules of war in the
conflict with the United States for the purposes of article 4A(2). The question
under the Geneva Convention is limited to whether a party falling within the
ambit of article 4A(2) of the Geneva Convention has followed the rules of war
such that he qualifies for "prisoner of war" status. 163 A predetermined
Who Is Osama Bin Laden?, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
southasia/155236.stm (Sept. 18, 2001); see also David Johnson, Who Is Osama bin Laden?
Wealthy Saudi Exile Is a Suspected Terrorist Mastermind, at http://www.infoplease.com/spot/
osamabinladen.html
(last visited May 8, 2005).
157yoo & Ho, supra note 73, at 208.
158Id
"
15 9ld
"6Id.at 208.
161Hook, supra note 149.
162Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 1.
163
See Aldrich, supra note 148, at 895. ("Providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda and
sympathizing with it are wrongs, but they are not the same as failing to conduct their own
military operations in accordance with the laws of war. A nation that assists an aggressor thereby
156BBC,
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argument that the Taliban-as an entire regime-failed to follow the laws of
war is unpersuasive. At the minimum, the question of whether the Taliban
observed the laws of war is a question requiring the reasoned opinion of a duly
constituted tribunal; the Bush Administration's predetermined, generalized,
predilections are insufficient.
The third condition under article 4A(2) of the Geneva Convention
requires combatants to openly carry arms and wear fixed insignia or other
distinctive signs for identification. 64 The requirement will be fulfilled if the
Taliban had even a remote means of identification. Here, the Northern Alliance
helped U.S. soldiers distinguish civilians from combatants.165 The Department
of Defense, however, has indicated that Taliban members cannot be identified
except by the tribal flag that they canry. 166 The Bush Administration has argued
that flags cannot qualify as insignia under the Convention. 167 The Convention's
objective is to differentiate combatants from criminals. Regardless of whether
tribal flags qualify as insignia, it cannot be disputed that the flags served as a
means of identification. Moreover, in Afghanistan, unlike in Iraq, civilians did
not bear arms and fight against the United States. 168 Hence, article 4A(2)'s
requirement is fulfilled.
Even assuming that the Taliban lacked any identifying means, the
combatants may fall within the ambit of the FAP. Under the FAP, combatants
are protected provided they are "under a command responsible to that
Party."' 169 Under article 44(3) of the FAP, such combatants are required to
carry arms openly, "'during each military engagement, and during such time as
he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment

commits a wrong, but its armed forces should not, as a consequence, lose their entitlement, if
captured, to POW status.").
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4A(2), at 3320.
164See
165The distinguishing feature prevents civilians from taking unlawful advantage of
soldiers. See Hook, supra note 149.
uniformed
166See Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 3 (stating that Taliban lacked fixed
insignia but that they carried tribal flag). The memo suggests that barring the tribal flag, Taliban
members cannot be distinguished. Id. The memo also argues that the Taliban as an entire
organization lacked a proper leader and therefore did not satisfy the condition requiring them to
wear fixed
insignia. Id.
16 7
1d.
168

Hook, supra note 149 ("Afghanis habitually and customarily carry weapons about their
persons."). Hence the author argues that although the Taliban met the requirement of carrying
arms openly, it is merely a societal norm with little intended consequence in terms of the
international laws of war. Id. Unfortunately, "intention to carry arms openly" is not a
requirement under the Geneva Convention. Id. Nor does carrying arms as a part of societal
an exception to fulfillment of the condition. Id.
norms create
169FAP, supra note 6, art. 43(1), at 23. Under this section, the commander is responsible
for enforcing international law within the units. Id. Whether such enforcement was made is
subject to the determination of the tribunal. Id. If a tribunal determines that no such enforcement
was made, combatants may become ineligible for protection. Id.
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preceding the launching of an attack"' in which he is to participate. 170
Combatants who fail to wear the identifying symbols or carry arms openly may
fall outside of the protection of both article 4A(2) of Convention III and article
44(3) of the FAP. Under article 44(4), however, combatants failing to meet the
requirements "shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all
respects to those
accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by
17 1
this Protocol."'
In any case, the status of Taliban detainees who violated article 4A(2)
cannot be determined by their captors. 72 Instead, the detainees shall be granted
the same protection as a "prisoner of war" until a tribunal, as required under
article 5 of Convention III, is established. 73 Until such a tribunal is
operational, all detainees should be treated humanely. 74 A general denial of
protection for all members of the Taliban is a violation of the principles of
international law.
4. Al-Qaeda Detainees
Al-Qaeda fighters can be divided into three classes: citizens of
Afghanistan, international fighters, and members of al-Qaeda captured outside
the United States as a part of the war on terror. The Bush Administration's
refusal to provide Convention protections to al-Qaeda detainees and instead to
categorize the detainees as "illegal combatants" is based on several factors, the
foremost being that al-Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party. 75
Considering the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, Afghan
citizens subscribing to al-Qaeda would most likely have fought alongside the
Afghan army (the Taliban). Such combatants will fall within the ambit of
article 4A(l) as "'members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of" the
Taliban forces. 76 As militia members, al-Qaeda fighters forming a part of

170Clover, supra note 22, at 363 (quoting Convention III) (basing argument on precedent
created171with Viet Cong during Vietnam war).
FAP, supra note 6, art. 44(4), at 23.
172
But see Bybee February Memorandum, supra note 54, at 2 (arguing that Taliban as
entire 173
organization lacked proper leader and therefore did not satisfy fixed insignia condition).
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3322-24.
74
1 Id.
75

1 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 18, at 6; see also Letter from United States
Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file
with author). See generally Bybee January Memorandum, supra note 50, at 4 (arguing that alQaeda is nonstate actor and that conflict is in itself not subject to article 2 of Geneva
Convention).
176Azubuike, supra note 63, at 143 (quoting Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4) (arguing
that Taliban and al-Qaeda are not distinguishable and hence are entitled to same status and that
members of al-Qaeda do not qualify under any subsections of Geneva Conventions).
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Afghanistan's armed forces will qualify for the status of "prisoners of war"
under article 4A(1) of the Convention.'7 7
The status of those who fought independently for al-Qaeda should be
based on the tribunal's determination of whether the combatants followed the
conditions in article 4A(2). Under this subsection, the Bush Administration has
78
argued that al-Qaeda fighters failed to distinguish themselves from civilians.1
In an independent article, Professor Yoo, the Assistant Attorney General of the
Bush administration, argued that al-Qaeda members "cannot claim the benefits
of a treaty to which their organization is not a party."'1 79 In the same article,
however, Professor Yoo reiterates that, despite being nonstate actors, all
terrorists, including al-Qaeda, should follow the international conventions of
war (to which they are not parties). 180 A "Working Group Report" by the
Pentagon used Professor Yoo's argument with respect to the Taliban
detainees. 18 As previously noted, to argue that nonstate actors must adhere to
rules of war, but to refuse protections that follow from such adherence is
unpersuasive. Such reasoning merely deprives al-Qaeda of incentive to observe
182
the rules of war, and places the lives of American soldiers in greater danger.
Alternatively, Professor Yoo argues that Convention III's application to
"international conflicts" is limited to situations involving two High Contracting
Parties or to "'armed conflict not of an international character,"' such as an
internal insurgency. 183 Hence, Professor Yoo argues that the conflict with alQaeda is excluded from the purview of the protections of the Geneva
Conventions. 8 4 However, it seems unlikely the Conventions' drafters meant to
protect detainees from civil insurgencies, but excluded-for no specific
reasons-international insurgents fighting an international army.

177Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4, at 3320-22. See generally Bybee January
Memorandum, supra note 50, at 9 (arguing that al-Qaeda cannot fall within protections of
Convention because conflict is not subject to article 2 of Geneva Convention and that article 4
applies78only to conflicts subject to article 2 of Convention).
1 Yoo & Ho, supra note 73, at 216.

179id.
1'°Id. at 216-18.
81
182WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 82, at 4.
1 yoo & Ho, supra note 73, at 216-18.

183 d.at 214 (quoting Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3, at 3518-20); see also Hook,
supra note 149 ("There is another reason that members of the al Queda (sic) network are not
entitled to prisoner of war status. Distinctions 'between bellum, war against legitimus hostis, a
legitimate enemy, and guerra, war against latrunculi-pirates. . .and outlaws [that are] 'the
common enemies of mankind,' have been made as early as Roman times and have been
incorporated into the international laws of war. It is alleged by Sir Michael Howard, an eminent
military historian, that the Geneva Conventions were drafted to address bellum/legitimus hostis
conflicts, and that states in conflicts with guerra/latrunculicould summarily execute those types
of enemies
because they have no right to participate in hostilities.").
184yoO & Ho, supra note 73, at 216-18.
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5. InternationalFighters
Persons detained or captured in a conflict by nationals of countries other
than their own are protected persons under Article 4 of Convention IV.
Generally, the application of Convention IV is limited to civilians. 185 However,
the definition of "protected persons" includes civilians and nationals of
countries that are not a party to the conflict irrespective of whether they were
combatants in the conflict. 186 Some of the international fighters in the war on
terror will fall within the definition of protected persons. Importantly, article 4
does not require a person to have been captured at the conflict zone in order for
that person to qualify for protected person status. 87 Protected person status,
however, does not apply if the detainee:
88
(a) is not a national of a signatory of the Geneva Convention,'
(b) belongs to a neutral nation having normal diplomatic representation
with the captor nation, or
(c) is an individual qualifying for the protected persons status but
suspected of or having engaged in activities hostile to the security of the captor
nation. 189

Once detained, a tribunal must determine whether the detainee is a
national of a state that is not a party to the Convention or a national of a neutral
state. Until such determination is made, the detainee shall be entitled to
humane treatment under article 5 of Convention 111.190
Interestingly, the Geneva Conventions do not specifically envisage a class
of detainees belonging to neutral countries taking up arms on behalf of one of
the parties to the conflict outside the regular army. 191 Thus, combatants from
neutral countries-like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan-who fight for al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan may not fall within any of the provisions of the Convention.
International fighters who are neither citizens of the United States nor
Afghanistan who are captured in the conflict zone cannot qualify for protection
under article 4A(1) of Convention IV, even if they fight alongside the
Afghanistan army. Such fighters, if detained, will also fall outside the
definition of prisoner of war under 4A(2) of Convention 1II, since they do not
185

See Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 6, at 3518.

' 86Id. art. 4, at 3518.
18 7 Id.
188
1d.
89

1 1d

190Convention III, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3324.
191But see Paust, supra note 40, at 1351 ("Under the Geneva Conventions, there is no gap
in the reach of at least some forms of protection and rights of persons. Any person detained,
whether a prisoner of war, unprivileged belligerent, terrorist, or noncombatant, has at least
minimum guarantees in all circumstances, at any time and in any place whatsoever under
common Article 3." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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fulfill the condition of belonging to either of the parties to the conflict. Even
assuming that al-Qaeda or the Taliban pays them for their role in the conflict,
such fighters still may not qualify for protection as mercenaries under article
47 of Convention IV. 192 To that extent, if detained, such fighters cannot claim
the benefits of prisoner of war status, or of protected person status under
Convention IV; nor can they claim protection as civilians taking up arms
spontaneously. Their status as protected persons will be dependent on the
nature of the diplomatic relationship their country has with the United States.
Thus, the exact categorization of these combatants within the Convention
remains unclear.
Nonetheless, lack of proper status does not leave international fighters
open to inhuman treatment. Article 1 of the FAP entitles everyone not covered
under the Conventions and Protocols to humane treatment at the hands of the
captors during detention. 193 Article 75 of the FAP adds that "persons who are
in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more
favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be
treated humanely in all circumstances." ' 94 Despite reservations concerning the
Protocol, the United States regards the provisions of Article 75 of the FAP as
an "articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy
are entitled."'' 95 International bilateral treaties may also govern the status of
such fighters and require
captors to repatriate captured fighters to countries that
196
will not torture them.
International fighters having connections with the 9/11 attacks who are
captured, not as part of the war, but within Afghanistan, can be tried by the
United States for the domestic crimes of murder and hijacking. Al-Qaeda
members captured outside of the conflict zone as a part of the war on terror fall
within the jurisdiction of the country where they are captured. For example,
two suspected terrorists, Bin-Al-Sheed and Khaleed Sheik Muhammed, were
captured in Pakistan. Khaleed Sheik Muhammed, a Kuwaiti national, was
placed under the United States' custody with permission from the respective
nations. 97 Generally, repatriation to either the prisoner's home country or to
the United States will be based on bilateral treaties and political agreements
between the respective nations. Detainees from a neutral country, like Bin-Al192Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 45, at 3548.
93
1 See FAP, supra note 6, art. 1, at 7.

'94Id. art. 75, at 37.
195
William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features,28
YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003); see also Jordan Paust, The Common Plan to Violate the
Geneva
Convention, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/paust2.php (May 25, 2004).
196
Mofidi and Eckert argue that giving prisoner of war status to detainees does not compel
the United States to repatriate the detainees at the end of the conflict before prosecuting the
detainees for their alleged involvement in terrorist crimes against Americans. See Mofidi &
Eckert,97supra note 29, at 89.
1 Richard Boucher, Spokesman, United States Department of State, Daily Press Briefing
(Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18144.htm(last visited May

8, 2005).
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Sheed and Khaleed Sheik Muhammed, may be exempt from protected person
status. Such individuals, if not from a neutral country (or if not from a
nonsignatory country) will become protected persons under article 4 of
Convention IV.
Interestingly, since nationals of neutral states are exempt from protected
person status, detainees like Bin-Al-Sheed and Khaleed Sheik Muhammed
cannot be subject to treatment authorized under article 5 of Convention IIItreatment meant for those suspected of activities hostile to the security of the
state. The status of such detainees remains akin to international criminals,
although as soon as they are placed in the custody of a party to the conflict,
such as the United States, such persons will fall within the ambit of article 75
of the FAP.' 98
Referring particularly to foreign fighters, Larry Di Rita, chief spokesman
for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, said, "there is a body of law which
suggests that there could be individual cases in which, while the general
provisions apply, an individual case could be exempted."' 99 This statement was
in reference to the exemption under article 5 of Convention IV, which
disqualifies suspected spies from the protections. Article 5, however, exempts
protected persons suspected of "or engaged in activities hostile to the security
of the State" from rights and privileges under the Convention IV, including
rights of communication. 200 As mentioned above, the article 5 cannot be
applied to all international fighters as a class, nor can it be applied to all
detainees suspected of activities hostile to the security of the United States.
The exemption in article 5 applies to those falling within the definition of
protected persons under article 4 of Convention IV. With respect to the conflict
in Afghanistan, all countries except Afghanistan itself have remained neutral.
Therefore most, if not all, of the international fighters detained from the
Afghan war will not fall within the ambit of article 5, even if such individuals
are known to have engaged in activities hostile to the security of the United
States. The status of such detainees may be governed by other conventions and
customary international law as discussed above.
American citizens arrested in the field of battle as enemy belligerents can
be tried for treason in addition to the above-mentioned sanctions. 20 1 Moreover,
international fighters holding American citizenship may be tried for "crimes
98
1199
FAP, supra note 6, art. 75, at 37.
Larry Di Rita, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Department Operational
Update Briefing (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr2004O5260797.html (last visited May 8, 2005). Elsewhere in the same press conference, Di Rita
mentioned that, "I understand that there ...[may be] legal precedent that would provide for...
a determination
[as to whether] they were not in fact subject to the Geneva protections." Id.
20
°Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3520.
2°lLegal Issues from Afghanistan, supra note 88; see also Michael Greenberger,
Is
Criminal Justice a Causality of the Bush Administration's "War on Terror?", 31 HUMAN
RIGHTS No. 1, at 19 (2004) (explaining other classes of prisoners include citizens captured
outside battlefield, say, within United States itself).
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against humanity" as set forth in the statute of the International Criminal
Court.2 °2 Human Rights Watch articulates that, although most adjudicated
cases address crimes against humanity committed in an ongoing war organized
under state authority, "recent jurisprudence provides for the commission of
such crimes in peacetime and by non-state actors. 2 °3 The Bush
Administration, however, has invoked the doctrine of enemy combatant against
U.S. citizens captured fighting for al-Qaeda.2 °4 Ex Parte Quirin established the
enemy combatant doctrine for those who violate international law and the laws
of war, including U.S. citizens.2 °5
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines
of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information
and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of
waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples
of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.20 6
Commentators have criticized the treatment meted out by the
Administration to such enemy combatants.20 7 Most criticisms center on the
denial, among other things, of the right to counsel and judicial review.0 8
Importantly, most enemy combatants probably would qualify for prisoner of
war status but for their American citizenship. Considering that prisoners of war
are entitled to a fair trial, including components of due process and a right to
representation with procedural safeguards under the Geneva Conventions,
enemy combatants should not be denied these rights because they are

202

Legal Issues from Afghanistan, supra note 88 ("[O]ther inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health qualify as crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack are generally
considered as crimes against humanity." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
203id

2°4For general background on enemy combatant law, see Nickolas A. Kacprowski, Note,
Stacking the Deck Against Suspected Terrorists: The Dwindling Procedural Limits on the
Government's Power to Indefinitely Detain United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants, 26
SEATrLE U. L. REV. 651, 654-75 (2003). The Administration derived the right to classify
American citizens as "enemy combatants" from Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which
discussed the circumstances under which American citizens may be charged as enemy
combatants.
Id. at 35.
205
See Greenberger, supra note 201, at 20.
206
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
2°7See, e.g., Clover, supra note 22, at 388 (arguing that Guantanamo detainees should
have
been classified
as prisoners of war under Geneva Conventions).
2 08
See Greenberger, supra note 201, at 19.
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American citizens.2 °9 In addressing the issue of detaining American citizens
falling within the definition of enemy combatants, the United States Supreme
Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 21 ° that while there is no bar to a nation
holding its own citizen as an enemy combatant in times of war, indefinite
detention is not authorized by an act of Congress providing the power of
detention. 2 1 The Court held that due process demands that a citizen held in the
United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for his detention before a neutral decision maker.2 12
The question of whether the Guantanamo Bay prisoners-including
international fighters-are entitled to rights under the United States
Constitution because of the location of their detention depends on whether
Guantanamo Bay is, in fact, a territory under the control of the United States.
In an agreement signed by Cuban President Estrada Palma and President
Theodore Roosevelt, the United States leased the territory in 1903.213 Thus,
although Cuba remains the de jure sovereign, the United States has been the de
facto sovereign for a century.214 However, the United States has argued before
the Supreme Court that Guantanamo Bay falls outside its jurisdiction since the
territory remains under the sovereign control of Cuba.215 Such arguments are
meant to deny detainees in Guantanamo constitutional rights otherwise
available to American citizens.21 6 A Working Group Report on the
interrogation of terrorists, however, takes the position that Guantanamo Bay is
a special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.2 17 Without
discussing the detainees' rights, the Working Group Report argued that 18
U.S.C. § 2340A," 8 the statute prohibiting torture, did not apply to protect the
209

See Craig M. Bradley, The Rights of Enemy Combatants, 40-Apr TRIAL 72, 72-75
(2004) (discussing Hamdi case). See generally Schaffer, supra note 120, at 1467-74 (discussing

rights of foreign combatants).

210124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).

21lId. at 2635.
2 12

1d.
M.E.
2131

MURPHY,

THE

HISTORY

OF

GUANTANAMO

BAY,

ch.

III

(1953),

(last visited May 8, 2005).
http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/gazette/History-98-64/hischp3.htm
214
Joanne
Marnier,
A
Guantanamo-Size Hole
in
the
Constitution,
1,
2003).
(Dec.
http://www.veteransforpeace.org/AGuantanamo-size_120103.htm
215

at

See generally Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 21-45. For the Supreme Court
decision in the matter, see Al Odah v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); see also Hicks,

Habib Lawyers Appear Before the US Supreme Court (Australian Broadcasting Co. radio
broadcast, Apr. 21, 2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s 1091669.htm

in Rasul v. Bush).
(providing
216 synopsis of Ted Olsen's argument
See Paust, supra note 191, at 1358 ("[T]he United States and its nationals cannot avoid
responsibility under international law by merely transferring persons to other states for torture or
cruel and inhumane interrogation.").
217See WORKNG GROUP REPORT, supra note 82, at 7 ("That GTMO is within [Special
Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction ("SMTJ")] of the United States is manifested by the
prosecution of civilian dependents and employees living in GTMO in Federal District Courts
based on SMTJ and the Department of Justice opinion."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340(3) (2000)
(defining "United States" in U.S. criminal code).
21818 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000).
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detainees in Guantanamo Bay because it requires the offense to occur outside
the United States.21 9
E. Status of Prisonersfrom Iraq
In the conflict between the United States and Iraq, combatants fighting for
Iraq can be categorized as soldiers under the command of the General
Headquarters, Special Forces of Iraq, or Fedayeen Saddam. Outside of this
structure, the detainees include those following, for example, Muktadar-alSadar, other insurgents, and civilians taking up arms.
1. The IraqiArmy
At the end of the First Persian Gulf War, fought between Iran and Iraq
from 1980 to 1988, Iraq supported the largest military in the Middle East, with
approximately seventy army divisions and over 700 aircraft within its air
force. 220 The war affected the economy and left Iraq with serious debts,
including an estimated $14 billion debt to Kuwait. 221 By some accounts, the
pressures of the debt in 1990 caused Saddam Hussein, the now-deposed leader
of Iraq, to invade Kuwait. 222 The invasion of Kuwait resulted in a battle
between Iraqi forces and a coalition of thirty-four countries authorized by the
United Nations and led by the United States.223 The coalition's victory resulted
in Kuwait establishing its sovereignty and Iraq losing its military supremacy in
the region. 224 The Iraqi ground forces shrank to twenty-three divisions and the
Iraqi Air Force had less than 300 aircraft after the Second Gulf War with
Kuwait.225 Iraqi forces were under the command and control of the General
Headquarters.2 26 Controlled by the Army, the General Headquarters was the
highest military echelon of Iraq and integrated the army, air force, navy, and
popular army operations.22 7 The General Headquarters consisted of three
categories of personnel: the regular army corps, the strategic corps reserve
designated the "Republican Guard Forces Command, 228 and a separate
2191d.;
see also Michael Froomkin, OLC's Aug. 1, 2002 Torture Memo ("the Bybee
Memo 220
'), at http://www.discourse.net/archives/2004/06/ (June 14, 2004).
TheFreeDictionary.com, Military of Iraq, at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/

(last visited
22lid. May 8, 2005).
222

TheFreeDictionary.com, Iran-Iraq War, at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/
(last visited
May 8, 2005).
223
TheFreeDictionary.com, Gulf War, at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ (last
visited2241d.
May 8, 2005).
225ld"
226
GlobalSecurity.org,
Iraqi
Army
[hereinafter
Iraqi
Army],
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/army.htm (last visited May 8, 2005).
227
1d.
228
id.

at
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aviation command supporting the corps and the Republican Guards.229
Personnel falling within the General Headquarters formed the regular,
uniformed troops of Iraq.23 °
The corps and the Republican Guards formed the ground forces and
conducted operations wherever directed. 231 The Republican Guard was
separated from the regular army guards and received the best training and
232 By 2003, there were between 65,000 and 100,000 troops in
equipment. 23
the
Republican Guard.233 The Special Republican Guard consisted of 15,000 to
20,000 troops and formed one division of the Republican Guard.234 Founded in
the early 1990s, the Special Republican Guard was charged with protecting
Saddam Hussein and responding to threats to his power, such as rebellion or a
coup. 235 The regular army corps, in 2003, consisted of 300,000 troops,
organized into five corps.236 Within the regular army, the highly trained Special
Forces conducted special operations.23 7 Members of the Iraqi Corps,
Republican Guard, and Special Republican Guard are eligible, if detained, for
prisoner of war status under Convention
III, article 4A(1) as "members of the
'238
armed forces of a Party to the conflict.
2. Fedayeen
Another class of fighters, Fedayeen, consisted of paramilitary forces loyal
to Saddam Hussein. 239 The Fedayeen consisted of approximately 18,000 to
229

Id.
2 30
23

1d

Id.
232

GlobalSecurity.org,
Republican
Guard,
at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/rg.htm (last visited May 8, 2005) (stating that
Republican Guards protected government tanks, mechanized infantry, and Special Forces). By
the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1987, the Republican Guard had grown to three armored
divisions, one infantry division, and one commando division. John Pike, Republican Guard,at
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/iraq/rg/ (last updated Nov. 26, 1997). The Republican Guard
Forces Command was divided into two subcorps groups, an independent division, twenty special
forces 233
(commando) brigades, and one naval infantry brigade. Id.
Jonathan Curiel, GIs' 'Unfinished Business' with Republican Guard,S.F. CHRON., Mar.
26, 2003,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2003/03/26/MN138223.DTL.
234
TheFreeDictionary.com,
Iraqi
Republican
Guard,
at
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ (last visited May 8, 2005).
23 5

237

Id "

See

SpecialOperations.com,
Iraqi
Special
Forces,
at
http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/Iraq/Default.htm
(last visited May 8, 2005)
(explaining that Iraqi regular army had three basic types of divisions: armored, mechanized
infantry, and infantry); IraqiArmy, supra note 224.
238Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4A(l), at 3320; see also Goldman, supra
note 38
(expressing same view).
239TheFreeDictionary.com,
Fedayeen
Saddam,
at
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ (last visited May 8, 2005) (explaining that "name
means 'Sacrificers of Saddam' and was chosen to imply a conceptual relationship with
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40,000 young soldiers. 240 The unit reported directly to the Presidential Palace,
and was responsible for patrol, antismuggling duties, and protection against
domestic opponents. 241 Most paramilitary organizations, including that of
Saddam Hussein, have a uniform.242 The Fadayeen is an irregular troop, akin to
militia, reporting, however, to the President of Iraq.243 Article 4A(1) of
Convention III specifies that members of armed forces "as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces" are entitled to
prisoner of war status. 2 4 The Fedayeen is both a militia and a volunteer corp.
Despite its irregular character, it falls within the armed forces because the
Fedayeen members directly reported to the highest commander-in-chief,
Saddam Hussein. Critics may argue that the Fedayeen was not a part of Iraq's
regular armed forces and lacked elite military training. The standard, however,
in the Geneva Conventions is merely whether such245militia members formed a
part of the "armed forces" of a party to the conflict.
The term "armed forces" should be contrasted with the term "regular
armed forces" used in article 4A(3) of Convention III. To be entitled to the
Convention protections, militia-like Fedayeen-need not fall within the
regular military force of a country as long as they are part of the armed forces
resisting another party to the conflict. 246 With respect to the 2003 invasion of

Palestinian guerillas termed Fedayeen who operated primarily from Israel's founding into the
1950s"); see also GlobalSecurity.org, Saddam's Martyrs ["Men of Sacrifice"] [hereinafter
Fedayeen], at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/fedayeen.htm (last visited May 8,
2005) (explaining that "paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam's 'Men of Sacrifice') was
founded by Saddam's son Uday in 1995). "In September 1996 Uday was removed from
command of the Fedayeen. Uday's removal may have stemmed from an incident in March 1996
when Uday transferred sophisticated weapons from Republican Guards to the Saddam Fedayeen
without Saddam's knowledge. Control passed to Saddam's other son, Qusay, further
consolidating
his responsibility for the Iraqi security apparatus." Id.
240
Fedayeen, supra note 239.
24
1

id
242

TheFreeDictionary.com, Paramilitary, at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/
(last visited May 8, 2005); see also Sharon Otterman, What Is the Fedayeen Saddam?, at
http://www.cfr.org/background/background-iraq-fedayeen.php (last updated Mar. 31, 2003)
(giving background on Fedayeen Saddam).
43Otterman, supra note 242.
244Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4A(l), at 3320.
245
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4(1), at 3320.
246
See Goldman, supra note 38 ("The legal situation of the Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen
fighters is quite different. They are apparently irregular combatants and, as explained above, in
order to qualify for POW status, the group collectively and its individual members must comply
with the strict conditions specified in Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Since
these irregulars must continuously comply with these requirements, it is difficult to imagine how
any members of this group could qualify for that status if, as has been widely reported, some of
their members commit war crimes or disguise themselves as civilians in the course of the
hostilities."). In my opinion, the mere use of civilian disguise by a combatant is not a war crime,
but, as previously noted, could deprive irregular combatants of POW status. See Convention III,
supra note 6, art. 5, at 3324 (requiring all members to be treated as prisoners of war until
violations are determined).
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Iraq by the United States, when the "Iraqi regular forces, as well as the
Republican Guard, melted away before the coalition, Fedayeen forces put up
stiff and often fanatical resistance to the coalition invasion. 247 The Fedayeen
members were trained to act as the last front of resistance and, to that extent,
formed a part of the armed forces. Within the army, the Fedayeen acted as
enforcers, threatening to kill soldiers who tried to surrender.24 8 Had the
Fedayeen been a militia unconnected to the armed forces, they could not have
wielded such power within the armed forces. The CIA allegedly distributed to
policymakers a classified report in early February, 2003, warning that the
Fedayeen could be expected to employ guerrilla tactics. 249 The awareness and
the categorization of Fedayeen as a part of the resisting armed forces obligates
the United States to provide detained Fedayeen members prisoner of war
privilege.
Critics argue that Fedayeen members often wore civilian clothes to
confuse coalition forces during the war. Unlike Convention III, article 4A(2),
which requires combatants to have identifying marks or wear a uniform,
"prisoner of war" status for militia members and voluntary corps forming a
part of the armed force is not conditioned on the requirement to wear
uniforms.25 0 Hence, denying prisoner of war status to the Fedayeen could be a
violation of Convention III, article 4A(1). 251 The captured members of
Fedayeen, may however, be tried for violations of the laws of war and for war
crimes, especially relating to guerilla warfare.
3. InternationalFighters
Arms-bearing fighters in Iraq from other nations-like Syria or Saudi
Arabia-will be entitled to the same treatment as their counterparts in the
conflict between the United States and Afghanistan.252 Such fighters, therefore,
will generally not be eligible for protection as "prisoners of war" under the
Geneva Convention. 253 They may, however, be eligible for protected person
status, especially if they are from countries like Syria, which presumably does
not have normal diplomatic relations with the United States. Individual
detainees who do not qualify for protected person status may be held under
Convention III, article 5.54
247

Fedayeen, supra note 239.

248

Otterman, supra note 242.

249
id.
250
Convention
25 1

III, supra note 6, art. 4, at 3364.
1d"
252
See supra Part II.D.5 (describing treatment of international fighters in Iraq).
253
See Goldman, supra note 38 ("[Floreigners who, for whatever reason, join the fight
against Coalition forces without being members of Iraqi regular or irregular forces can be
considered as waging "private" hostilities and treated as unprivileged combatants and prosecuted
as such.").
254
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3322-24.
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4. PopularArmy
The Iraqi Popular Army consisted of civilian volunteers to protect the
Ba'ath regime against internal opposition. It served as a power base
counterbalancing the regular army.2 55 Captured members of the popular army
fall within Convention III, article 4A(2) and are subject to the conditions of the
article. Hence, until determination of the status of such detainees by a
competent tribunal, 5 6 they are entitled to the treatment akin to that given a
prisoner of war.257
Suspected insurgents captured by the American forces in Iraq have
belonged to various militia organizations, the most well-known being led by
255

GlobalSecurity.org, People's Army/Popular Army/People's Militia (Al Jaysh ash
Shaabi), at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/militia.htm (last modified Apr. 27,
2005). Sharon Otterman writes:
Experts say this is intended to be a mass volunteer force, with female as well as male
units. The Iraqi regime showcases the brigades at public marches and other
propaganda events and claims it has up to 7 million members. U.S. experts say its
strength is greatly exaggerated by the Iraqis. But they also believe that at least some
al Quds members-who hail largely from Sunni areas in the middle of the countryhave been given rifles, mortars, and light automatic weapons .... There are reports
that a so-called youth army, made up of 12 to 17 year-olds, was formed in 1999 to
defend the cities. It is unclear that such a force exists, but some Iraqi media coverage
does show youths and adults being trained and possibly armed for such a role.
Ashbal Saddam, or Saddam's Cubs. This is a military organization for children aged
10 to 16 that holds annual war training camps. However, like other popular forces,
the extent to which it is involved in the war is unknown.
Otterman,
256 supra note 242.
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3322-24 ("Should any doubt arise as to
whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent
257 tribunal.").
Convention IV provides:
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an
individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile
to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such
rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the
favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy
or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security
of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under
the present Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in
case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by
the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a
protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the
security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.
Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3520-22.
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Muktadar-al-Sadar and the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.258 Such members
will fall within the ambit of Convention III, article 4A(2). The status of
captured insurgents depends on whether they satisfied the conditions under the
article. Here, insurgents belong to one party to the conflict, Iraq, and are
clearly directed by a leader, whether it is Al-Sadar or A1-Zarqawi. Whether
they carried arms openly and conducted their operations according to the laws
of war is less clear, considering several reports that insurgents attacked the
Coalition forces by either disguising themselves as civilians or through the use
of guerilla warfare. Again, as argued in the previous section, the loss of status
of one or more individual insurgents does not disqualify all members of that
militia or voluntary corps from prisoner of war status unless it can be proved
that the militia never had an identifying mark or that they never carried
weapons openly. The status of the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, when
captured, may be classified similar to that of Khaleed Mohammed in
Afghanistan.2 59
5. Saddam Hussein
As the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi military, Saddam Hussein is a
member of the armed forces. 260 Under article 4 of Convention III, Saddam
Hussein is eligible for prisoner of war status. Hence, the United States should
treat him humanely during captivity. Prisoner of war status, however, does not
preclude the United States or other nations from trying Saddam for war crimes
and past violations of the law, including war crimes allegedly committed
during the Iran-Iraq war and first Gulf War.26 1
The United States captured Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003.262
His status as a prisoner of war was declared on January 9, 2004.263 During the
interim period from capture to declaration of status, article 5 of Convention III
obligates the United States to accord Saddam Hussein the status of a prisoner
of war.264 The United States fulfilled thet requirement by declaring that
258

BBC,
Profile:
Abu
Musab
al-Zarqawi, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle259east/3483089.stm (last updated Sept. 22, 2004).
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
260
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4, at 3320-22; see also Human Rights Watch, Saddam
Hussein
26 as a P.O.W., at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/27/iraq7076.htm (Jan. 22, 2004).
Human Rights Watch, supra note 260 ("He could also be prosecuted for crimes against
humanity and genocide such as for the 1988 Anfal campaign against Iraqi Kurds, the large-scale
killings that followed the failed 1991 uprisings in the north and south of Iraq, and the brutal
repression of the Marsh Arabs. While Saddam Hussein could also be tried for common crimes
under Iraqi law, he could not be prosecuted under criminal laws enacted ex post facto (after the
fact) by
the Iraqi Governing Council or a foreign state.").
262
CNN, Saddam Hussein Captured, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/saddam/
(last visited
May 8, 2005).
263
Guy Taylor, Pentagon Deems Saddam a Prisonerof War, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StorylD=20040109-085155-6079r.
264See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 5, at 3322-24.
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Saddam Hussein would be treated like a prisoner of war until the final
declaration of his status under the Convention. 65
The United States, however, telecast pictures of Saddam Hussein's
medical examination during capture. The pictures were released before the
determination of the status of Saddam Hussein on January 9, 2004.266 Article
13 of Convention III specifies that "prisoners of war must at all times be
protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against
insults and public curiosity., 26 7 The last phrase prohibits broadcast of
photographs of prisoners.268 Thus, the telecast of the medical examination of
Saddam Hussein may be viewed as a violation of the article by the United
States.269
As for trial for war crimes, article 129 of Convention III obligates parties
to try suspected war criminals in domestic courts or to hand over such
detainees to another High Contracting Party-in this case, Iraq.2 70 Hence,
Saddam Hussein could have been tried under the laws of United States. Article
84 of Convention III, however, specifies that a "prisoner of war shall be tried
only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power," here
the United States, permit trial by local civil courts.2 71 Article 84's use of the
courts" is different from Article 53's use of the term "military
term "military
2 72
tribunal.
The United States helped the Iraqi Governing Council establish an
independent Iraqi Special Tribunal to facilitate the trial of Saddam Hussein and
other Iraqi nationals or residents falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 273 It
is unclear whether a Provisional authority of an occupied territory can establish
such tribunals. Article 84 of Convention III implies that prisoners of war will
be tried by the detaining power.274 On the other hand, article 129 obligates the
High Contracting Parties to enact necessary legislation to provide effective
265

Paul
Reynolds,
Analysis:
Putting
Saddam
on
Trial,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middleeast/3318531.stm (last updated Dec. 17, 2003) ("In the
meantime, the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said that the former Iraqi leader will
be 'accorded the protections of a prisoner of war and his treatment will be governed by the
Geneva Convention."').
266Peter Wilkinson, Amnesty: Saddam Photo Humiliating, at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/
(Dec. 18, 2003).
WORLD/meast/12/18/sprj.irq.saddam.photo/
267
See Convention III, supra note 6, art. 13, at 3328.
268
269

1d.
1d.

27°Id. art. 129, at 3418.
27
Id. art. 84, at 3382.
272
Compare id. ("A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the
existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been
committed by the prisoner of war."), with id. art. 5, at 3322-24.
273Human & Constitutional Rights, Iraqi Special Tribunal to Try Crimes Against
(last updated Apr. 13, 2005).
Humanity,
274 at http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/iraqitribunal.html
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 84, at 3382.
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penal sanctions for violations of the Convention.27 5 It is, therefore, unclear
whether the Provisional authority can be construed as a High Contracting Party
when it is still under occupation.
Human rights organizations have been concerned that the Special
Tribunal "lacks key provisions to ensure that the trials are conducted in
accordance with basic international human rights standards. 276 It has been
pointed out that the Tribunal fails to fulfill two requirements of article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 277 First,
the Iraqi statute establishing the Tribunal does not require judges and
prosecutors to have experience working on complex criminal cases or cases
involving serious human rights crimes. The statute prohibits appointment of
experienced non-Iraqi prosecutors or investigative judges.278 Second, the
statute does not require that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 279 The
violations of the ICCPR also violate Convention III, article 84, which states
that the prisoner of war shall not be "tried by a court of any kind which does
not offer the 28essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally
0
recognized.,
III. THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The treatment of detainees is governed by multiple treaties and
international customary law. 281 The Geneva Conventions contain restrictions
275

Id. art. 129, at 3418.

276

Human Rights Watch, supra note 260.
2771d.; see also ICCPR, supra note 132.
278
Human Rights Watch, supra note 260.
279
1d.; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 13:
Equality Before the Courts and the Right to a Fairand Public Hearing by an Independent Court
Established
by
Law
(Art.
14),
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/O/
bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd?Opendocument (Apr. 13, 1984) ("By reason of the
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof of the charge is on the prosecution and the
accused has the benefit of doubt. No guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved
beyond28reasonable doubt.").
°Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 84, at 3384 ("In no circumstances whatever shall a
prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which
does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105.").
281While not discussed in this paper, the United States also prohibits torture in 18 U.S.C. §
2340A. Section 2340, paragraph 1 defines "torture" as "an act committed by a person acting
under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
custody or physical control." 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000). Section 2340, paragraph 2 further
defines "severe mental pain or suffering" as
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from-(A) the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the
administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mindaltering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality; (C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the treat that another person
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governing the treatment of prisoners of war.282 Moreover, torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is a violation of international human
rights standards under international customary law and the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("Convention Against Torture").283 The discussion in this section is limited to
an analysis of the specific restrictions set forth in both of these conventions,
the alleged treatment of detainees by the United States, and whether that
treatment may violate those restrictions.
First, both conventions absolutely prohibit torture.2 84 The question of what
conduct is categorized as torture is open to debate, although the Convention
Against Torture contains a definition of torture. 285 For example, the United
States argues that conduct prescribed as torture must be inflicted with specific
intent and that torture only includes the most egregious conduct.2 86
Additionally, while the question of whether torture may ever be justified or
excused is subject to current academic debate,287 the United States takes the
position that defenses, such as self-defense and necessity, may excuse
torture.288 Second, under both conventions, treatment that does not rise to the
level of torture is also prohibited, though perhaps not absolutely. The question
of what constitutes torture and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" is also

will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
Id. The United States' definition of torture is considered narrower than the definition used in
international law. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-821, 1465 U.N.T.S. 1-24841, 112
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture], http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcat39.htm.
282
Conventions).
283See infra Part IV (detailing restrictions of Geneva
Acts of torture also likely violate the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and customary international law. See African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 50; ICCPR, supra note 132; American
Convention of Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 125; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res.
284 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
See Convention Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 2; Convention III, supra note 6,
at 3318-20.
art. 3,285
Convention Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 1.
286
See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee August Memorandum], available
(last visited May 8, 2005).
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf
287
See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 24; Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A
Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 (2004); Oren Gross, Are Torture
Warrants Warranted?PragmaticAbsolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481
(2004); Marcy Strauss, Torture,48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201 (2004); Richard A. Posner, The Best
note 24).
Offense,
288 NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28 (reviewing DERSHOWITZ, supra
See Bybee August Memorandum, supra note 286, at 39-46.
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debated. The lines between both types of conduct are not well defined by the
conventions or case law.
Third, the Geneva Conventions demand a higher standard of conduct from
parties controlling detainees and prisoners of war by prohibiting "intimidation"
instead of restricting the prohibition to "torture" and "cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment." Moreover, the limited definition of torture in the
Convention Against Torture and the United States' narrow interpretation of the
term may not limit the definition of torture prohibited under the Geneva
Conventions. In other words, the Geneva Conventions may prohibit a broader
scope of conduct than does the Convention Against Torture.
The Convention Against Torture protects detainees excluded by the
Geneva Conventions, such as the foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Convention Against Torture may not provide as much protection to detainees
as the Geneva Conventions, but it still prohibits intentional acts defined as
torture and requires that parties prevent cruel and inhuman treatment or
punishment.
IV. THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR UNDER
GENEVA CONVENTION III
The United States and Iraq are signatories to the Geneva Convention III,
which sets forth restrictions on torture relative to the treatment of prisoners of
war.289 Moreover, even if the United States were not bound by the Geneva
Convention III, some provisions concerning torture restrictions in the Geneva
Convention III are considered international customary law. Accordingly, the
torture restrictions described in the Geneva Convention III bind the United
States. The following is a description of the articles in the Geneva Convention
III concerning and relating to torture restrictions.
The distinguishing feature of the Geneva Convention is that intention is
not a requirement to breach the restrictions concerning the treatment of
detainees. Notably, the convention creates two classes of breaches: "serious
breach" 290 and "grave breach.",29' Although none of the Geneva Conventions
discuss the differences between the two types of breach, "willful conduct" is
required to commit a grave breach.2 92 Violation of article 13 results in a serious
breach, which does not expressly require intent.293 On the other hand, article
130 characterizes a grave breach as willfully engaging in prohibited conduct,
such as torture.294 From this, it is apparent that the definition of torture in the
289

For an extensive discussion of the rights of unlawful combatants under the Geneva

Convention IV, see generally Derek Jinks, The Declining Signficance of POW Status, 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J.
290 367 (2004).

Convention III, supra note 6, art. 13, at 3328.
291Id. arts. 129-30, at 3418-20.
'92Id. art. 130, at 3420.
293
Id.

294

art. 13, at 3328.

Id. art. 130. at 3420.
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Geneva Conventions does not include a requirement of intent; if it did, the
language in article 130 would be superfluous.
Articles 13 and 17 are the primary articles in the Geneva Convention III
concerning torture restrictions and the treatment of detainees. 295 A violation of
any of the restrictions described in Articles 13 and 17 results in a breach of the
Geneva Convention III. Notwithstanding the calls of commentators to create
exceptions for the torture of prisoners of war in cases wherein information is
296
there are no exceptions to the
needed to avoid a catastrophic event,
111.297
Convention
restrictions stated in
Article 13 generally requires that prisoners of war be humanely treated at
all times. 298 The article also prohibits any act or omission which "cause[s]
death" or "seriously endanger[s]" the health of a prisoner of war. 29 9 Article 13
further prohibits physical mutilation of prisoners of war and medical or
scientific experiments conducted on prisoners of war. 300 The meaning of
"seriously endangers the health" is unclear. That phrase is not defined in the
Convention. "[C]ause death" and "seriously endangers the health" appear to
focus on the result of a particular action. Thus, an action which may not cause
death or seriously endanger the health of a prisoner of war, but may threaten
death or serious endangerment of the health of a prisoner of war, may not
violate this provision. The article does not expressly prohibit only those acts
which are intentional. The article appears to include not only a prohibition of
intentional acts, but also reckless and negligent acts that cause death or
seriously endanger the health. Moreover, use of the word "any" before "acts"
indicates an intent that the article broadly cover all actions that may "cause
death" or "seriously endanger the health," whether intentional or not.
Article 13 also requires that the detaining power affirmatively protect
prisoners of war, specifically from acts of violence or intimidation.30 1 The
detaining power's duty to protect prisoners of war from acts of violence or
295Convention III, supra note 6, art. 13, 17, at 3328-32. The Convention continues:

Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health
of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious
breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected
to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are
not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned
and carried out in his interest.
Id. art.2 9613, at 3328.
See supra note 287 and accompanying text (citing to several commentators' views on
whether
297torture is ever justified).
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 13, at 3328.
298ld.
2 99

,d.

301

d. The second paragraph of Convention III, article 13 provides: "Likewise, prisoners of
war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and
against insults and public curiosity." Id.
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intimidation implies that the detaining power will not inflict acts of violence or
intimidation on prisoners of war. Unfortunately, "acts of violence or
intimidation" are not defined by the Convention. Moreover, the terms
"violence" and "intimidation" are not defined. Webster's New International
Dictionary defines "intimidation" as the "act of making timid or fearful or of
deterring by threats; state of being intimidated."3 °2 The second paragraph of
article 13 appears to be the broadest prohibition in the Convention. Obviously,
an act may be an act of intimidation or violence and at the same time not cause
death or seriously [endanger] the health of a prisoner of war. However, a
violation of Convention III, article 13, paragraph two may be a lesser offense
than a violation of article 13, paragraph one, the violation of which is a
"serious breach" of the Convention. There is no such language applicable to
the prohibitions stated in the second paragraph. Article 13 also requires that
detaining powers must protect prisoners of war against insults and public
curiosity. 30 3 Finally, any measure of reprisal against prisoners of war is
prohibited. 304 Again, the terms "measure" and "reprisal" are not defined.
Article 17 of the Geneva Convention III prohibits the infliction of
physical or mental torture for the purpose of obtaining information."' Article
17 not only prohibits torture, but further "any other form of coercion" to secure
information.30 6 Moreover, if a POW refuses to provide information, he or she
may not be "threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind. 30 7 The term "torture" is undefined by the Geneva
Convention. However, the term is defined in the Convention Against Torture
to include a prohibition on the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
physical or mental, to obtain information or a confession, to inflict punishment,
or to intimidate.30 8 The definition in the Convention on Torture may be
borrowed to define torture under the Geneva Conventions. As used in article
17, "torture" appears to mean some form of treatment that is more egregious
3 02

WEBSTER's NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1301 (2d ed. 1934) (1998).
Convention III, supra note 6, art. 13, at 3328.
3
041d.
303
305

Id. art. 17, at 3330-32 ("No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion,
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant
or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.").
36
1d. art. 13, at 1328.
3 07
1d.
308

The Convention Against Torture defines "torture" as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 1.
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than "any other form of coercion."30 9 Thus, committing some act of coercion
that does not amount to torture may violate Convention III. As such, an act of
coercion may include unintentional, reckless, or negligent acts or omissions
that may cause pain or suffering. Moreover, a prohibited act of coercion need
not be intentional or cause severe pain or suffering. However, the standard set
forth in the Convention Against Torture may not apply to the meaning of
"torture" in Convention III because article 1, paragraph two of the Convention
Against Torture states: "[t]his article is without prejudice to any international
instrument or national legislation which does not or may contain provisions of
wider application. 3 10 As a result, the definition of torture in Convention III
could be defined as being broader than the definition set forth in the
Convention Against Torture. Thus, the Geneva Conventions may not require
that torture include a requirement of intent.
Article 17 further states that prisoners of war who refuse to answer
questions may not be "threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind."3 11 Accordingly, threats and insults are
prohibited. The use of the word "any" indicates that "unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment" is to be broadly construed.3 12
Moreover, Article 130 states that act such as "willful killing, torture, or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health" are considered "grave breaches"
of the Geneva Convention 111. 3 13 Arguably, article 130 addresses a higher level
of torture as willful torture. As such, an argument can be made that willful
torture may be a grave breach, but torture that is not willful is still a breach.
Possibly, torture that is not willful falls within the ambit of article 17; when
torture is committed willfully, it rises to the level of article 130. Moreover,
defining torture so as to require an intent would render the term "willful" in
Article 130 superfluous.3 14 Accordingly, torture may not be a grave breach
unless it is willful.
Several other articles of Convention III contain restrictions concerning the
humane treatment of prisoners of war. Article 22 states in pertinent part that:
"[p]risoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and
affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness."3 1 5 Article 25 provides
in pertinent part that:
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as
those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the
309
Convention
3
1°Convention
31

III, supra note 6, art. 17, at 3330-32.
Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 1, 2.
'Convention III, supra note 6, art. 17, at 3332.

3 12

1d.
313
3 14

1d. art. 130, at 3420.

315

1d.

Id. art. 22, at 3336.
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same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits
and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to
their health. The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war
individually or collectively, shall be entirely protected from
dampness and adequately
heated and lighted, in particular between
3 16
dusk and lights out.
Article 26 states in relevant part that: "The basic daily food rations shall be
sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good
health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional
deficiencies. . . . Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are
prohibited., 317 Article 27 provides in relevant part that: "[c]lothing, underwear
and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by
the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance for the climate of the region
where the prisoners are detained., 318 Article 29 and article 30 require adequate
sanitary facilities and medical attention, respectively. 31 9 Article 87 in Chapter
III, which is entitled "Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions," provides in relevant
part that, "[c]ollective punishment for individual acts, corporal punishment,
imprisonment in premises 32without
daylight and, in general, any form of torture
0
forbidden.
are
or cruelty,
V. RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER

CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

The United States is a party to the Convention Against Torture. In
addition to the prohibition of torture, the convention also requires participating
321
parties to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The Convention explicitly states that, "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war . . . or any public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture. 3 22 The Convention,
however, does not contain a similar statement absolutely barring cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in all circumstances.
Accordingly, a participating party may not have to prevent "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" if exceptional circumstances exist which
justify or excuse that treatment.323 Moreover, the Convention prohibits
3

"Id. art. 25, at 3338.
Id. art. 26, at 3340.

317

318
319 1d.
1d.
32

art. 27, at 3340.
art. 29-30, at 3342.
1 d. art. 87, at 3384.
321
Convention Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 16.
322
1d. art. 2, 2.
323

See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 78-84 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing justifiability of infliction of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment).
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extradit[ion] to another country "where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 324
The Convention Against Torture specifically defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person
325
acting in an official capacity.

Accordingly, for conduct to be defined as torture, that conduct must include:
(1) severe pain and suffering; (2) intent; (3) some government involvement;
and (4) a prohibited purpose.326 The convention fails to define "severe" or
"intent."
The United States Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to
implement the Convention Against Torture.32 7 Section 2340A of 18 U.S.C.
prohibits torture, and § 2340, paragraph one, defines torture as requiring a
specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.32 8 In a
memorandum dated August 1, 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Department of Justice interpreted § 2340A to require a prohibition of inflicting
acts specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering.3 29 The
memorandum noted that the Convention Against Torture does not specify
whether general or specific intent is necessary, only that torture is "any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person.', 330 The memorandum, however, took the position that
to be sure, the text of the treaty requires that an individual act
intentionally. This language might be read to require only general
intent for violations of the Torture Convention. We believe, however,
that the better interpretation is that the use of the phrase
"intentionally" also created a specific intent-type standard. In that
event, the Bush administration's understanding represents only an
explanation of how the United States intended to implement the
324

Convention Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 3,

325

1d. art. 1.

326Id

327

'

See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000).
328
1d.

329Bybee August Memorandum, supra note 286, at 3.

DOM. at 14-15.
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vague language of the Torture Convention. If, however, the
Convention Against Torture established a general intent standard,
then the Bush understanding represents33 a modification of the
obligation undertaken by the United States. 1
As recognized by the Bush Administration, the Convention, by its text, does
not include a requirement of specific intent or exclude
a demonstration of
332
general intent to satisfy the requirement of "intent."
In addition to a prohibition of torture, Article 16 of the convention also
states that
[e]ach State Party shall undertake to prevent ...other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount
to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.333
The Senate ratified the Convention 334 and included reservations that state the
United States only considers itself bound to prevent cruel and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.335 It is clear that cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment is something less than what
constitutes torture under the Convention. However, the Convention itself does
not define "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." According
to the reasoning of the European Commission on Human Rights, interpreting
the same language in another treaty, "degrading treatment" tends to humiliate
or drive a victim against his or her will or conscience, and "inhuman
treatment" is a deliberate infliction of severe mental or physical suffering.33 6
331

Id. at 15 n.7.

3 32

1d.
333
Convention
334

Against Torture, supra note 281, art. 16, 1.
The memorandum also took the position that § 2340A is unconstitutional if it interferes
with the president's constitutional power to conduct a military campaign. Bybee August
Memorandum, supra note 286, at 31. Finally, the memorandum asserted that torture may be
justified
335 by defenses such as self-defense and necessity. Id. at 39.
See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, United Nations Treaty
Collection,
Declarations
and
Reservations,
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatyl2_asp.htm
(Feb. 5, 2001).
336
RODLEY, supra note 323, at 90-92. According to commentators, the use of the terms
torture and inhuman treatment by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment do not refer to two different categories of
conduct on a continuum. See Rod Morgan & Malcom D. Evans, CPT Standards:An Overview,
in PROTECTING PRISONERS 39-40 (Rod Morgan & Malcom D. Evans eds., 1999). Morgan and
Evans write:
Torture is almost exclusively used to refer to physical ill-treatment employed
instrumentally by the police .... The terms inhuman and degrading, used either
separately or together, have been reserved for forms of environmental ill-treatment,
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The United Nation's Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials posits
that the section "should be interpreted so as to extend to the widest possible
protection against abuses, whether physical or mental., 337 Moreover,
categorizing specific conduct is a poor way to define torture because torturers
would avoid that conduct and create new ways to terrorize their victims. 338
The U.N. Committee on Human Rights, the European Commission on
Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights have clarified the
meaning of the terms "torture" and "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment., 339 Torture has been defined by the European Commission on
Human Rights to include "[s]evere beatings (often of the feet) with wooden or
metal sticks or bars without340breaking the bones or causing lesions, yet causing
intense pain and swelling.

chiefly concerning the conditions in which groups of prisoners are housed, where the
purposive element, at least in terms of a particular individual, is lacking or obscure..
. . Physical ill-treatment falling short of torture is not called inhuman or degrading
but is described as ill-treatment. Environmental ill-treatment falling short of the
inhuman or the degrading, and well below that which is deemed inhuman and
degrading, is said to be unacceptable or inadmissible, or it is said that it could be
considered to be inhuman anddegrading,but is not actually said to be so.
Id.

33 7

G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, art. 5, cmt. C, at 187, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/169 (1979), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/a34res169.pdf; see
also John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64 U. PITr. L. REv.
237, 240
338 (2003).
RODLEY, supra note 323, at 77.
339
Parry, supra note 337, at 240. Morgan and Evans explain:
What, then, is the threshold which the [European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CPT")] appears to
consider it necessary for physical ill-treatment to have crossed in order for it to be
described as torture? We conclude that the CPT has so far reserved the word
'torture' for what are perhaps best described as specialized, or exotic, forms of
violence purposefully employed to gain a confession or information or generally
intended to intimidate or humiliate. Other forms of violence of the sort frequently
reported to, and not infrequently found by, the Committee, such as blows with fists
or feet or batons or other weapons, have generally been deemed insufficient to
justify use of the terms 'severe ill-treatment' or 'torture', even when such blows
have apparently been inflicted either with the intention of causing pain or
purposefully with a view of extracting information. Physical ill-treatment has been
described as torture when, for example, evidence has been found of the use of
specialized techniques (such as the suspension of the victim, beating of the soles of
the feet, hosing with pressurized water, the placing of a metal bucket on the head and
then striking it with metal or wooden instruments and so on), the use of specialized
instruments (notably electric shock equipment), or special forms of preparation (such
as blindfolding or covering the victim's head with a blanket, or officers' face being
masked, to prevent the victim from seeing his or her tormenters.
note 336, at 34-35.
Morgan
340& Evans, supra
Parry, supra note 337, at 240. For a description of Israeli, British, and Chicago Police
Department torture case studies, see generally JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY
PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE (2000).
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Torture also includes the combination of being made to stand all day
for days at a time, beatings and withholding food; beatings and being
buried alive; electric shocks, beatings, being hung with arms behind
one's back, having one's head forced under water until nearly
asphyxiated, and being made to stand for hours.34 1
The European Court of Human Rights found that rape is torture.342
Additionally, the Human Rights Committee found threats of physical
mutilation to be torture, including being "blindfolded, beaten, stripped, placed
inside a tyre and sprayed with high pressure water., 343 Moreover, rape alone
has been classified as torture by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.344
Certain combinations of the following conduct fall within either or both of
the categories of torture and cruel or inhuman treatment:
[B]eing beaten, given electric shocks and then forced to stand,
hooded, for long hours, where the victim fell, broke his leg, and was
denied medical treatment for a period of time; electric shocks, having
one's hooded head put into foul water, having objects forced in one's
anus, and being forced to remain standing, hooded and handcuffed
for several days; and enduring a fractured jaw while being kept
hanging for hours by the arms, subjected to electric shocks, thrown
on the floor, covered in chains connected to electric current and kept
naked and wet.345
The "European Commission of Human Rights also found that beatings
and one or more of electric shock, mock execution, or refusal of food and
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The Estrella case also affords an example of the sort of mental suffering that may
amount to torture. Estrella complained of "psychological torture" which: consisted
chiefly in threats of torture or violence to relatives of friends, or of dispatch to
Argentina to be executed, in threats of making us witness the torture of friends, and
in inducing in us a state of hallucination in which we thought we could see and hear
things which are not real. In my own case, their point of concentration was my
hands. For hours upon end, they put me through a mock amputation with an electric
saw, telling me, "We are going to do the same to you as Victor Jara." Amongst the
effects from which I suffered as a result were a loss of sensitivity in both arms and
hands for eleven months, discomfort that still persists in the right thumb, and severe
pain in the knees.
Id. at 90
34 (citation omitted).
41do
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346
water were either torture or inhuman treatment."
According to Professor Parry, "few cases address the distinction between
torture and inhuman treatment, [and] the line between inhuman and
permissible treatment is not clear." 347 On one side of the spectrum, "[p]erhaps
beatings that are not severe and sustained, or an isolated practice-such as
wall-standing (being forced to stand spread-eagled on one's toes with fmgers
on the wall above one's head, so that the body weight is on the toes and
fingers)--would be inhuman treatment but not torture., 348 On the other side,
"slaps and blows after arrest" may not amount to cruel or inhuman
treatment. 349 At least one court, the European Court of Human Rights, has
stated that "[a] range of factors come into play in establishing whether a
victim's 'pain or suffering' is so 'severe' as to constitute 'torture,' as distinct
from other prohibited ill-treatment under the [Convention Against Torture]. 3 5 °
According to that court, determining whether treatment is torture depends on
"'all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its
physical or mental
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health
351
of the victim.'
The case of Ireland v. United Kingdom352 provides some illumination as
to the differences between torture and inhuman treatment, and inhuman
treatment and permissible conduct. In that case, British soldiers subjected Irish
Republican Army members "to wall-standing for hours, hooding, continuous
353
loud and hissing noise, sleep deprivation, and restricted food and water."
The European Commission of Human Rights determined that that treatment
was torture; however, its ruling was reversed by the European Court of Human
Rights in a thirteen to four vote.35" While the court found by a sixteen to one
vote that the practices were inhuman and degrading, those practices did not
amount to torture.3 55 That court stated that "the difference between torture and
inhuman treatment 'derives principally from a difference in the intensity of the
suffering inflicted.' ' 356 "Because torture is an 'aggravated' form of inhuman
treatment that carries 'a special stigma,' it should be reserved for practices that
exhibit a 'particular intensity and cruelty. ',317 This decision has been criticized
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35See HumanRightsFirst.org, U.S. Law Prohibits Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment,
at
http://humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/after_91
1/PDF/torture.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005).
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by commentators and human rights groups that believe those practices were
clearly torture.35 8
Notably, the United States State Department's 2003 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices has condemned other countries from participating in
the following conduct: beatings, bindings, electric shock, stripping, solitary
confinement, suffocation, suspension, sexual assaults, forced painful positions,
sleep deprivation, threats (especially of sexual abuse), mock executions, dog
attacks, burning, blindfolding, and branding.3 59 While this list is not
exhaustive, it contains treatment that ranges 3from
torture to inhuman treatment
60
specifically condemned by the United States.
VI. REPORTED TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND DETAINEES BY
UNITED STATES

A. Allegations of Mistreatmentof Detainees at GuantanamoBay
According to a June 7, 2004, article in the Wall Street Journal, "[m]ethods
now used at Guantanamo include limiting prisoners' food, denying them
clothing, subjecting them to body-cavity searches, depriving them of sleep for
as much as 96 hours and shackling them in so-called stress positions., 36' The
article further states that "[a]lthough the interrogators consider the methods to
be humiliating and unpleasant, they don't view them as torture. 36 2
Human Rights Watch conducted several interviews with former detainees
at Guantanamo Bay. According to those interviewees, they were subjected to,
or witnessed other detainees being subjected to, threats of electric shock, cold
temperature, shackling or chaining for weeks, threats with military dogs,
isolation for long periods of time, and beatings. 363 Notably, some interviewees
reported that there was no abuse during interrogations. 3 6 Some theorize that
that interviewees considered to be "high value" or special risk may be
subjected to harsh treatment , while interviewees unlikely to have information
are not subjected to abusive treatment.3 65
The Secretary of Defense approved the following conduct for use in the
military prison at Guantanamo Bay:
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Category 1: Incentive, Yelling at detainee, Deception, Multiple
interrogator techniques, Interrogator identity; Category 2: Stress
positions for a maximum of four hours (e.g., standing), Use of
falsified documents or reports; Isolation of up to 30 days (requires
notice), Interrogation outside the standard interrogation booth,
Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, Hooding during transport
and interrogation, Use of 20 hour interrogations, Removal of all
comfort items, Switching detainees from hot meals to MRE,
Removal of clothing; Forced grooming (e.g., shaving), Inducing
stress by use of detainee's fears; and Category 3: Use of mild, non366
injurious physical contact.
The following conduct was reported to have been used by personnel at
Guantanamo Bay:
Category I: Yelling (not directly in ear), Deception (introduction of
confederate detainee), Role-playing interrogator in next cell;
Category II: Removal from social support at Camp Delta,
Segregation in Navy Brig, Isolation in Camp X-Ray, Interrogating
detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation
room at Camp Delta (e.g., Camp X-Ray), Deprivation of Light (use
of red light), Inducing stress (use of female interrogator), Up to 20
hour interrogations, Removal of all comfort items including religious
items, Serving MRE instead of hot rations, Forced grooming (to
include shaving facial hair and head-also served hygienic
purposes), Use of false documents or reports.367
B. Allegations of Mistreatment and Treatment of Detainees in Afghanistan
Human Rights Watch alleged that "U.S. officials have told journalists and
Human Rights Watch that U.S. military and intelligence personnel in
Afghanistan employ an interrogation system that includes the use of sleep
deprivation, sensory deprivation, and forcing detainees to sit or stand in painful
positions for extended periods of time. 368 The organization has also
documented abuse of detainees, including exposure to freezing temperatures
and severe beatings. 369 According to Human Rights Watch, "[d]etainees
complained about being stripped of their clothing and photographed while
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naked. 3' 70 Additionally, the Washington Post reported in a December 2002
article that
[a]ccording to Americans with direct knowledge and others who
have witnessed the treatment, captives are often "softened up" by
MPs and U.S. Army Special Forces troops who beat them up and
confine them in tiny rooms. And alleged terrorists are commonly
blindfolded and thrown into walls, bound in painful positions,
subjected to loud noises and deprived of sleep.371
Human Rights Watch also reports that
Afghans detained at Bagram airbase in 2002 have described being
held in detention for weeks, continuously shackled, intentionally kept
awake for extended periods of time, and forced to kneel or stand in
painful positions for extended periods. Some say they were kicked
and beaten when arrested, or later as part of efforts to keep them
awake. 3 Some
say they were doused with freezing water in the
72
winter.

Moreover, Human Rights Watch asserts that the "United States has still not
provided any adequate explanation for four, and possibly five, suspicious
deaths of detainees that took place in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003." 373 One
incident involved the death of an Afghan detainee "due to hypothermia after 374
he
was doused with cold water and left shackled in an unheated cell overnight.,
C. Allegations of Mistreatment and Findings of Torture or Inhuman or
DegradingTreatment in Iraq
The report, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police
Brigade, also known as the "Taguba Report," outlines findings and allegations
of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees in Iraq.375 The
Taguba Report was prepared by Major General Antonio M. Taguba at the
request of his superior officers.376 The purpose of the report was to:
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1d. "According to the Los Angeles Times, this case was referred by the CIA to the
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Abuse375
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a. Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent
allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment
at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
(BCCF);
b. Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported
by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the
Abu Ghraib Prison;
c. Investigate the training, standards, employment, command
policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP
Brigade, as appropriate; and
d. Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the
investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action,
as appropriate.37 7
The Taguba Report found that the following conduct was engaged in by
United States contractors and/or military police:
a. Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked
feet;
b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions
for photographing;
d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them
naked for several days at a time;
e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
f. Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while
being photographed and videotaped;
g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on
them;
h. Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on
his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to
simulate electric torture;
i. Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to
have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then
photographing him naked;
j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and
having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
1. Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and
frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely
injuring a detainee; [and]
m. Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.378
377
378
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The Taguba Report also found that detainees described the following acts
of abuse:
a. Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on
detainees;
b. Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
e. Threatening male detainees with rape;
f. Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee
who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
g. Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom
stick; [and]
h. Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees
with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a
detainee.379
General Taguba found those statements "credible based on the clarity of their
statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses. 38 °
D. Treatment and Alleged Mistreatmentof DetaineesMay Violate Standards
in Geneva Convention III and Convention Against Torture
It is unclear whether the arguably lower standards of the Geneva
Convention III or Convention Against Torture apply to the conduct described
above. Considering that the military tribunal required under article 45 of
Convention III has not become functional yet, the status of all detainees has
not been determined. Thus, all detainees are covered under article 5 of
Convention III, which requires the Detaining Power to treat the detainees like
prisoners of war until their status is determined by a competent tribunal. 381 As
discussed earlier, the prisoners of war are entitled to humane treatment. Thus,
even detainees who are unlikely to receive permanent protection from the
Geneva Convention-for example, foreign fighters-fall within the purview of
the Geneva Convention III since their status remains undetermined. The
alleged treatment of the prisoners, if true, may well violate the restrictions of
Convention III. At the very minimum, almost all of the conduct described
above would be impermissible under the standard of "intimidation" outlined in
Convention 111.382 Moreover, sodomizing detainees with a chemical light or
broom stick and raping a female soldier are clearly torture under the Geneva
379
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Convention III. If the definition of torture asserted by the Bush Administration
is adopted, it is unclear whether the requisite specific intent is present for some
of the acts described above to be considered torture. If that definition is not
used, a finding of general intent would likely be supported and thus, those acts
would be considered torture under the Convention Against Torture. However,
acts, such as using military dogs to frighten prisoners, prolonged sleep
deprivation, and beatings, would likely be categorized as cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.
VII. CONCLUSION
This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to
it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it.
Although a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back,
it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and
recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important
component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day,
they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its
difficulties.38 3
The Bush administration has taken a position which attempts to dance
around international law to achieve the objective of obtaining high quality
information from detainees. There is no dispute that obtaining high quality
information about future terrorist attacks is critical to preventing future attacks,
but at what cost? A more prudent approach by the Bush administration would
have been use of the worldwide support received after 9/11 to modify the
international rules of law concerning the treatment of detainees of war on
terror. At that point, the world would likely have been receptive to creating
exceptions to international law to even allow the torture of detainees in order to
prohibit a catastrophic terrorist attack.384 Instead, the Bush administration, by
its actions, has jeopardized respect for the rule of law, reduced its standing in
the international community, and placed its own soldiers and citizens captured
in future conflicts at risk.
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"The authors are not suggesting that torture may ever be excused or justified in any
circumstance. We are only suggesting that had the Bush Administration either taken that
position or explored other alternatives, it is likely that they would have received support without
jeopardizing the rule of law and United States military personnel in future conflicts.

